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LOG IN TO THE DANGER ZONE:  DATA 
PRIVACY UNDER THE SCA AND MICROSOFT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The year is 2018 and the United States government suspects Frank of 
operating “Velvet Boulevard,” an elaborate and infamous black market 
hosted over the dark web.1  Frank uses an email account and briefly visits 
the United States.  During his trip, Microsoft migrated Frank’s email data 
to a server in Chicago to decrease the time it takes him to access his emails.  
When Frank returned to his native land of Russia, his email data is again 
migrated, but Microsoft may retain some of his subscriber information in 
the United States.  Assuming Microsoft re-migrates Frank’s data, § 2703(d) 
of the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) empowers the government to 
effortlessly compel Microsoft, the Internet service provider (“ISP”), to 
hand over his stored non-content data no matter its location.2  Furious 
                                                
1 This is a hypothetical scenario that is solely the work of the author.  The facts of this 
situation closely parallel the facts from In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) obligates domestic 
Internet service providers (“ISPs”) to turn over to the government data located abroad on a 
Microsoft server).  The government sought email data stored by Microsoft and linked to an 
unidentified individual’s account in relation to a federal criminal investigation.  Id. at 467–
68.  The government issued a warrant authorized by the SCA, compelling Microsoft to 
retrieve the data and surrender it to the government.  Id.  Microsoft moved to quash the 
warrant because the email data was located in Dublin, Ireland.  Id.  But see Matter of Warrant 
to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp. v. United 
States, 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (invalidating the warrant approved by the lower courts 
because the data was in Ireland); Joseph Cox, Court Rules to Extradite Suspected Silk Road 
Admin from Ireland to the US, MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 12, 2016), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/court-rules-to-extradite-suspected-silk-road-admin-
from-ireland-to-the-us [https://perma.cc/25SY-EFTT] (alleging that the unnamed 
individual at the center of Microsoft is an operator of the notorious dark web organization 
known as Silk Road).  Recently, an Irish court approved the individual’s extradition to the 
United States.  Id. 
2 See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (providing the requirements 
for a court order under the SCA).  The statute states: 
A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued 
by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only 
if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire 
or electronic communication, or the records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.  
In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court order shall 
not issue if prohibited by the law of such State.  A court issuing an order 
pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service 
provider, may quash or modify such order, if the information or records 
requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such 
order otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider. 
Id. 
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over the United States’s data seizure, the Russian government refuses to 
honor the United States’s extradition request.3  After a failed covert 
operation by United States Special Forces to extract Frank from Moscow, 
Russia dispatches warships to Chinese waters.  Within hours, the eyes of 
all humankind are upon what could be the beginning of the World War 
III.  Though this is an unlikely situation, it exists as an example of a worst-
case scenario when domestic law enforcement spills over into the 
international theatre. 
Because Microsoft is already collecting all of Frank’s data for 
advertisement purposes, the government’s task to obtain that data is 
simple:  obtain a SCA court order or subpoena.4  A SCA court order or 
subpoena is unique because it allows the government and its agents to 
obtain the non-content data of wire or electronic communications related 
to a crime without physically traveling to the facility that houses the 
information.5  This functionality is different from the traditional operation 
of a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(“F.R.C.P.”) 41, which require the seized materials to be located in the 
district that the warrant is issued.6  Despite the government’s nascent 
ability to obtain data that is located abroad, the SCA does not expressly 
authorize extraterritorial application of its mechanisms.7 
Further, SCA § 2703(d) (“§ 2703”) empowers the government to 
compel disclosure of non-content user data without proving probable 
cause.8  Along with email, the government may compel disclosure of any 
incidental records of stored electronic communication, including:  bank 
and hospital records, information stored in the cloud, information 
transmitted via wearable health technology (“Fitbits”), or content 
                                                
3 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 477 (upholding a court order authorized by 
SCA § 2703(d) (“§ 2703”) to compel disclosure of data controlled by Microsoft and stored in 
Ireland). 
4 See infra Part II.B (detailing how the government compels disclosure by ISPs through 
mechanisms authorized in the SCA). 
5 See infra Part II.B (examining the process by which the government obtains and executes 
a court order under § 2703(d)). 
6 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“[A] magistrate judge with authority in the district—or if 
none is reasonably available, a judge of a state court of record in the district—has authority 
to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the 
district . . . .”). 
7 See infra Part II.B (discussing the specific text of the SCA regarding territorial limits on 
jurisdiction and enforcement).  Since Microsoft is a unique case involving extraterritorial 
implications of data privacy, future courts, especially those not within the Second Circuit, 
may choose to follow or ignore its principles.  Id. 
8 See infra Part II.B (providing a framework of the discreet mechanisms of § 2703 that 
assign a specific standard of proof required to compel disclosure of different amounts of 
customer data). 
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accessed by a child on the family tablet.9  With the SCA, law enforcement 
agencies enjoy unbridled access to data shared by millions of individuals 
and stored by their ISPs on a daily basis.10 
To fortify modern email privacy, this Note proposes an amendment 
to § 2703(d) to restrict the federal government’s ability to compel 
disclosure from ISPs.  First, Part II explores the history and the language 
of the SCA, the Microsoft case with respect to extraterritorial application 
and the reduced standard of proof, and the recently enacted California 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“CalECPA”) by the California 
legislature in an attempt to cure the issues with the current SCA apparent 
in Microsoft.11  Next, Part III examines the constitutional weaknesses of the 
SCA, assesses potential privacy issues users of stored communications 
may face following Microsoft, analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of 
the CalECPA, and proposes an amendment that integrates requirements 
from the CalECPA into § 2703(d).12  Finally, Part IV recapitulates and 
concludes this Note.13 
                                                
9 See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 366 (2015) (examining 
the scope of the SCA regarding real time and stored Google Chat and FaceTime data); 
Matthew R. Langley, Hide Your Health:  Addressing the New Privacy Problem of Consumer 
Wearables, 103 GEO. L.J. 1641, 1644 (2015) (examining privacy concerns with data transmitted 
by products such as Apple Watch and Fitbit); Steven R. Morrison, What the Cops Can’t Do, 
Internet Service Providers Can:  Preserving Privacy in Email Contents, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 253, 
270 (2010) (concluding that ISPs may freely search and seize email data without being subject 
to the constitutional limitations imposed on the government); Ned Schultheis, Warrants in 
the Clouds:  How Extraterritorial Application of the Stored Communications Act Threatens the 
United States’ Cloud Storage Industry, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 661, 662 (2015) 
(summarizing the corporate interests in cloud computing in the wake of Microsoft); Reema 
Shah, Law Enforcement and Data Privacy:  A Forward-Looking Approach, 125 YALE L.J. 543, 553–
54 (2015) (discussing that companies including Facebook and WhatsApp voiced concerns 
regarding the government’s reach under the SCA). 
10 See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide 
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1211 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, User’s Guide] 
(noting that the government does not need to prove probable cause to compel disclosure of 
a wide array of data); Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 664 
(2016) (noting that consumers today expect technology to resist modern surveillance 
techniques). 
11 See infra Part III.B–D (expounding on the relationship between the Fourth Amendment, 
the SCA, Microsoft, and the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(“CalECPA”)). 
12 See infra Part III.C (examining privacy issues resulting from Microsoft and potential 
solutions observable in the CalECPA). 
13 See infra Part IV (concluding that constitutional considerations should be added to 
§ 2703(d)). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
How far the U.S. government’s authority extends in bringing 
criminals to justice is often an issue of legal and scholarly debate.14  Today, 
the government compels ISPs to disclose individual users’ data under the 
authority of the SCA.15  In 2014, the Southern District of New York 
attempted to compel Microsoft to disclose email data stored in Ireland 
under the SCA in In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled 
& Maintained by Microsoft Corporation.16  Recently, the Second Circuit 
overturned the Southern District of New York in what is already being 
haled as a landmark ruling for data privacy.17  Still, Microsoft sparked 
                                                
14 See TianRui Grp. Co. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(finding the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) had authority to regulate conduct 
concerning intellectual property occurring in China); Kerrilyn Russ, On the Wrong Side of the 
Tracks:  An Analysis of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Non-Application of the 
Presumption against Extraterritoriality [TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 132 
(Fed. Cir. 2011)], 52 WASHBURN L.J. 685, 695–98 (2013) (examining TianRui and resultant 
arguments for and against limiting the reach of the government through the ITC); Viki 
Economides, TianRui Group Co. v. International Trade Commission:  The Dubious Status of 
Extraterritoriality and the Domestic Industry Requirement of Section 337, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 1235, 
1245 (2012) (cautioning extraterritorial application of the ITC’s domestic regulatory authority 
due to international considerations). 
15 See infra Part II.B (summarizing the provisions of § 2703); see also Deirdre K. Mulligan, 
Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications:  A Critical Perspective on the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1566 (2004) (concluding the Wiretap 
Act, the Pen Register Statute, and the SCA all function similarly with respect to email by 
generally prohibiting unsanctioned disclosure of information while providing exceptions, 
such as compelling an ISP to turn over data related to a criminal investigation). 
16 See 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (upholding the government’s SCA warrant 
and requiring Microsoft to retrieve and surrender email content data in a storage facility in 
Dublin); see also Russell Hsiao, Implications for the Future of Global Data Security and Privacy:  
The Territorial Application of the Stored Communications Act and the Microsoft Case, 24 CATH. 
U.J.L. & TECH. 215, 240–41 (2015) (describing the potential global effects of Microsoft in that 
the United States and Ireland maintain a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”) that 
normally governs international requests for persons or property). 
17 See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the SCA’s warrant provisions to apply extraterritorially); see also 
Jonathan Stempel, Microsoft Wins Landmark Appeal over Seizure of Foreign Emails, REUTERS (July 
14, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-usa-warrant-idUSKCN0ZU1RJ 
[https://perma.cc/X9Y4-HK4N] (framing the 3–0 decision by the 2nd Circuit Court of 
Appeals as a defeat for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and a victory for privacy advocates 
and technology companies).  Dozens of technology companies filed briefs leading up to the 
appeal, including Amazon, Apple, Cisco Systems, and CNN.  Id.  See also Sam Thielman, US 
Cannot Force Microsoft to Hand over Emails Stored Abroad, Court Rules, GUARDIAN (July 14, 
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/14/microsoft-emails-court-
ruling-us-government [https://perma.cc/W9NJ-DDE7] (conveying the wishes of Brad 
Smith, president and chief legal counsel for Microsoft, that the ruling would usher in new 
legislative discussion of digital privacy).  Smith stated, “[t]he U.S. government has a decision 
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discussion on both the government’s territorial warrant authority 
according to F.R.C.P. 41 regarding searches and seizures and the 
appropriate standard of proof the government must show to compel 
disclosure of email data.18  Against this backdrop, California enacted a 
state-specific analog to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(“ECPA”) in October of 2015, including a corresponding SCA signifying a 
shift in future laws governing a globally connected world.19 
First, Part II.A discusses the geographic origins of the Fourth 
Amendment and the cases forming this framework.20  Next, Part II.B offers 
an account of the legislative development of the SCA with regard to 
communications privacy.21  Then, Part II.C explores two key cases that 
defined email privacy expectations pursuant to the SCA.22  Finally, Part 
II.D presents recent legislation enacted by California in an attempt to 
resolve the lingering questions of data privacy under the SCA.23 
                                                
to make:  we can even [sic] spend the next two years arguing about a law that was passed 
thirty years ago, or we can talk about a law that is focused on the future.”  Id. 
18 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (restricting the government’s ability to conduct searches and 
seizures on citizens).  The Amendment mandates: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id.  See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“[a] magistrate judge with authority in the district . . . has 
authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the 
district . . .”); Joy L. Backer, Stop Waiting on the World to Change:  Compelled Disclosure of Email 
Content under the Stored Communications Act, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 397 (2015) (arguing 
the Supreme Court must rein in the authority of the SCA by requiring probable cause for all 
warrants seeking email correspondence). 
19 See Larry Magid, California Electronic Communications Privacy Act Protects Privacy AND 
Children, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/larry-
magid/california-electronic-com_b_8101848.html [https://perma.cc/4C2S-QQWS] 
(reporting the CalECPA strengthens privacy expectations of email users and helps further 
protect children from online abuse); In Landmark Victory for Digital Privacy, Gov. Brown Signs 
California Electronic Communication Privacy Act into Law, ACLU OF N. CAL. (Oct. 8, 2015), 
https://www.aclunc.org/news/landmark-victory-digital-privacy-gov-brown-signs-
california-electronic-communications-privacy [https://perma.cc/TSY8-R2P9] [hereinafter 
Landmark] (announcing the passage of CalECPA and its aim to secure data privacy for 
Californians); see also Jim Halpert & Michelle Anderson, BNA Insights:  State Privacy & 
Security Developments—Looking Back and Looking Ahead, 20 ELECTRONIC COMM. L. REP. 8, 19 
(2015) (examining the proposed CalECPA before its enactment and initial public reaction). 
20 See infra Part II.A (introducing the origins of the Fourth Amendment). 
21 See infra Part II.B (examining the SCA and its problematic provisions). 
22 See infra Part II.C (summarizing United States v. Warshak and Microsoft). 
23 See infra Part II.D (presenting the history and text of the CalECPA as a state statute 
focused primarily on individual privacy). 
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A. The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Data 
Before the 1950s, courts primarily limited the protections of the Bill of 
Rights to apply only within the national and territorial borders.24  Searches 
and seizures conducted by the government primarily concerned the 
physical world.25  For example, in Blackmer v. United States, the 
government served a subpoena on a U.S. citizen living in Paris, France, 
compelling him to return to the United States to testify in relation to a 
criminal investigation.26  Blackmer claimed because he was outside of 
United States jurisdiction, he was not subject to its laws or demands.27  The 
Supreme Court found that because Blackmer retained U.S. citizenship, the 
United States retained jurisdiction over him.28  Blackmer expanded the 
                                                
24 See United States v. Dorr, 23 S. Ct. 859, 864 (1900) (holding the constitutional right to a 
jury trial does not extend to non-U.S. citizens living in a territory acquired by the United 
States).  The Court stated that citizens of the Philippines were entitled to basic individual 
rights “by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution,” but not a right to a trial by 
jury.  Id.  See also Territory of Haw. v. Mankichi, 21 U.S. 787, 791 (1903) (finding the right to 
a habeas corpus hearing does not extend to inhabitants of the territory of Hawaii); see also 
Emlin McClain, The Hawaiian Case, 17 HARV. L. REV. 386, 387–88 (1904) (elaborating upon the 
distinctions between provisions of the Bill of Rights as applied to different classes of U.S. 
territories); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 
292 (2015) [hereinafter Kerr, Global Internet] (describing the nexus between the geographic 
location of the individual or materials and the corresponding level of Fourth Amendment 
protection). 
25 See Search, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 672 (10th ed. 2014) (categorizing a search as:  “[a]n 
examination of a person’s body, property, or other area that the person would reasonably be 
expected to consider as private, conducted by a law enforcement officer for the purpose of 
finding evidence of a crime”); Seizure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 678 (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
seizure as:  “[t]he act or instance of taking possession of a person or property by legal right 
or process; esp. a . . . confiscation or arrest that may interfere with a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy”); see also Amy E. Pope, Lawlessness Breeds Lawlessness:  A Case for 
Applying the Fourth Amendment to Extraterritorial Searches, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1917, 1919 (2013) 
(suggesting a rise in transactional organized crime led the government to blur the lines 
between territorial and extraterritorial searches under the Fourth Amendment); Backer, supra 
note 18, at 382 (noting the language of the Fourth Amendment focuses on physical intrusions 
similar to those imposed by British soldiers onto American colonists); Daskal, supra note 9, 
at 336 (laying out the foundation of the pre-Internet Fourth Amendment that relied heavily 
on the physical location of either the individual or materials to be searched); Kerr, User’s 
Guide, supra note 10, at 1209 (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s origination as a protection 
of the physical home). 
26 See 284 U.S. 421, 443 (1932) (upholding a contempt decree of a U.S. citizen for failing to 
return to the United States after being served a subpoena in France).  The court noted the 
interaction between a U.S. court and one of its citizens involves only those two parties, even 
if the citizen is located in another country.  Id. at 437. 
27 See id. at 436 (summarizing Blackmer’s location-based argument). 
28 See id. (finding the government may look abroad to bring wrongdoers to justice but 
must do so in accordance with the Constitution); Ronald S. Betman & Jonathan R. Law, The 
(Too) Long Arm of the S.E.C.:  When a Foreign Employee of a U.S.-Based Multinational Financial 
Services Client is Threatened with a Subpoena, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 10 (2013) (positing 
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government’s capability to regulate private activity occurring outside of 
the United States.29  As demonstrated in Blackmer, geographic location 
dominated Fourth Amendment analyses before the creation of the 
Internet.30  In 1967, the Court handed down another landmark decision in 
Katz v. United States, finding that the government must obtain a warrant 
supported by probable cause to conduct surveillance on a public 
telephone booth.31  There, the government sought wiretap content linked 
to a particular telephone booth.32  In his concurring opinion, Justice John 
Marshall Harlan advanced the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
standard under the Fourth Amendment and articulated a two-prong test 
for determining whether the government must obtain a warrant before 
tapping a phone.33 
                                                
individuals retain certain constitutional rights abroad because the government must still go 
through specific processes to compel an individual’s return). 
29 See Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV. 
L. REV. 193, 196 (1932) (describing the early rationales for pursuing criminals located beyond 
a nation’s borders); Kevin A. Meehan, The Continuing Conundrum of International Internet 
Jurisdiction, 31 B.C. INTL. & COMP. L. REV. 345, 347 (2008) (citing the nation’s ability to exert 
power over a citizen regardless of location as a prelude to early international Internet 
regulations). 
30 See Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 438 (implementing geography as a key factor in determining 
whether U.S. courts retain jurisdiction over individuals); P. Sean Morris, “War Crimes” 
against Privacy—the Jurisdiction of Data and International Law, 17 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 36 (2016) 
(describing the jurisdictional debate in Microsoft as the clashing of two legal cultures); see also 
Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 1209 (connecting the right to privacy to the right to 
property in terms of the expectation against unreasonable intrusions).  The most hallowed 
example of property is one’s home.  Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 1209.  Because most 
property is tangible, an intrusion close in proximity to one’s property results in a violation 
of one’s personal privacy.  Id. 
31 See 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding the Fourth Amendment protects the use of public 
pay phones); see also Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance:  Remembering the Lessons of the 
Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 35 (2004) (summarizing the thrust of Katz as a bright line test 
as to which communications are protected by the Constitution and which are not); Katz v. 
United States, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/35 [https://perma.cc/QWK8-
MVE8] [hereinafter OYEZ] (showing Katz was a seven to one decision).  Justice Thurgood 
Marshall did not participate in the arguments or ruling.  OYEZ, supra note 31.  See generally 
Johnathan Chait, Will the Supreme Court Just Disappear?, N.Y. MAG., (Feb. 21, 2016), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/02/will-the-supreme-court-just-
disappear.html [https://perma.cc/YGG8-EGYW] (reporting Justice Antonin Scalia’s vacant 
Supreme Court seat leaves many controversial cases in limbo, where even if the Court 
renders a decision, any controversial decision would result in a 4–4 stalemate).  This result, 
in essence, negates the Supreme Court even rendering a decision at all.  Id. 
32 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (summarizing the government’s argument that wiretap 
surveillance involves no physical intrusion of the telephone booth, and thus, no 
constitutional concern).  Responding to the fact that a telephone booth is a public area, the 
Court stated, “what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.”  Id. at 351. 
33 See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“There is a twofold requirement, first that a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation 
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Despite the expectation of privacy advanced in Katz, exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment, such as the third-party doctrine, allow warrantless 
government surveillance.34  According to the third-party doctrine, the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to information voluntarily disclosed 
to third parties if the third party in question has an independent, usually 
business, interest in receiving information from an individual.35  In 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Limited, the Supreme Court defined the 
territorial reach of third-party subpoenas and warrants.36  In Morrison, the 
government sought documents controlled by National Australia Bank 
(“the Bank”) under the authority of the Securities and Exchange Act.37  The 
Bank moved to quash the subpoena because the Securities and Exchange 
Act ambiguously references extraterritorial application of its provisions.38  
                                                
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).  Justice John Marshall Harlan 
noted that a telephone booth resembles a home for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that 
warrantless electronic surveillance may violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  See also Daniel 
Benoliel, Law, Geography and Cyberspace:  The Case of On-Line Territorial Privacy, 23 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 176–77 (2005) (applying the reasonable expectation of privacy advanced 
in Katz to Internet activity in the twenty-first century); Jayni Foley, Are Google Searches 
Private? An Originalist Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Online Communication Cases, 
22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 447, 455 (2007) (examining Justice Harlan’s concurrence from an 
originalist standpoint and describing when the government may justify an invasion of 
personal privacy); Dr. Saby Ghoshray, The Emerging Reality of Social Media:  Erosion of 
Individual Privacy through Cyber-Vetting and Law’s Inability to Catch Up, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 551, 569 (2013) (highlighting the second prong of the standard advanced by 
Justice Harlan and arguing society today believes email privacy is reasonable). 
34 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 568–69 (2009) 
[hereinafter Kerr, Third-Party] (examining the origin of the third-party doctrine regarding 
undercover informants’ use of concealed recording devices); Jacob M. Small, Storing 
Documents in the Cloud:  Toward an Evidentiary Privilege Protecting Papers and Effects Stored on 
the Internet, 23 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 255, 271 (2013) (summarizing arguments in favor 
of the third-party doctrine); but see Jace C. Gatewood, It’s Raining Katz and Jones:  The 
Implications of United States v. Jones-A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV. 683, 712–13 
(2013) (suggesting application of the third-party doctrine to electronic communications poses 
deep constitutional and policy concerns because a great deal of data is submitted 
unintentionally). 
35 See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1576–77 (discussing the basic principles behind the third-
party doctrine as a means of obtaining an individual’s business records voluntarily 
submitted to a third party, such as a bank); see also Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise 
of the Fourth Amendment Third-Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 50 (2011) (suggesting 
courts recognize an exception to the third-party doctrine for online communications if the 
message is reasonably necessary to meaningfully participate in society). 
36 See 561 U.S. 247, 269 (2010) (holding that the Securities and Exchange Commission may 
only regulate domestic transactions). 
37 See id. at 250 (emphasizing the Bank was a foreign entity with no connection to the 
United States). 
38 See id. at 268 (finding that based on the text and legislative history of a specific section 
of the Securities and Exchange Act, its provisions apply only to transactions occurring in the 
United States); Peta Spender & Michael Tarlowski, Adventures on the Barbary Coast:  Morrison 
and Enforcement in a Globalised Securities Market, 35 MELB. U.L. REV. 280, 298 (2011) (critiquing 
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The Court denied the government’s request for the documents and found 
that the “[t]he presumption against extraterritoriality prescribes when a 
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has 
none.”39  The tradition of the third-party doctrine leaves uncertainty 
regarding what privacy assurances courts will extend to email and other 
data.40 
Data is distinguishable from tangible objects in many ways.41  User 
data can be hidden and the owner may be disguised using sophisticated 
codes from anywhere in the world.42  The user can access emails without 
being anywhere near where that data is stored.43  For example, unlike a 
post card, a single sent email generally exists in many locations at once.44  
                                                
Morrison after balancing the importance of foreign and domestic matters between nations); 
Elizabeth A. Rowe & Daniel M. Mahfood, Trade Secrets, Trade, and Extraterritoriality, 66 ALA. 
L. REV. 63, 65 (2014) (approaching the challenges that corporations face when seeking judicial 
enforcement of court orders issued within the United States). 
39 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269 (finding the presumption against extraterritoriality 
necessary for resolving national and international disputes in an orderly manner).  Courts 
are not to contrarily interpret statutes contemplated and passed by Congress.  Id.  See also S. 
Nathan Williams, The Sometimes “Craven Watchdog”:  The Disparate Criminal-Civil Application 
of the Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 63 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1398–99 (2014) (expanding on 
the presumption against extraterritoriality in civil and criminal contexts). 
40 Compare United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418–19 (App. Armed Forces 1996) 
(holding that an individual enjoys Fourth Amendment protection of remotely stored 
America Online, Inc. (“AOL”) emails and rejecting the required disclosure rationale), with 
Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. 2001) (finding that defendant’s 
emails and chat room activity did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy); see also Ryan 
Walsh, Extraterritorial Confusion:  The Complex Relationship Between Bowman and Morrison and 
a Revised Approach to Extraterritoriality, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 627, 642 (2013) [hereinafter Walsh, 
Extraterritoriality] (noticing a revival of the presumption against extraterritoriality and 
providing specific national security exceptions to protect the country in a complex global 
environment). 
41 See Sherry F. Colb, What Is A Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine 
and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 134 (2002) (discussing how public and 
private considerations factor into data’s Fourth Amendment protection); David R. Johnson 
& David Post, Law and Borders-the Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1396–97 
(1996) (examining the separation of subsidiary spheres or levels within the Internet). 
42 See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 551 (2005) 
[hereinafter Kerr, Digital World] (finding many investigators prefer to copy an individual’s 
data via bitstream and review the copies rather than the originals). 
43 See Daskal, supra note 9, at 368 (describing the divisibility of data as both a convenience 
and a hazard for the individual user). 
44 See Schultheis, supra note 9, at 688 (stating the main enticement for cloud data storage 
is that it is accessible to the user anywhere Internet is available); see also Paul Schiff Berman, 
The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 344–45 (2002) (noting some states, 
California for example, regulate certain types of email transactions and tobacco 
advertisements); but see Kerr, Digital World, supra note 42, at 551 (“[A] search occurs when 
information from or about the data is exposed to possible human observation, such as when 
it appears on a screen, rather than when it is copied by the hard drive or processed by the 
computer.”). 
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Finally, law enforcement may search and seize data without physically 
traveling to a storage facility.45  Scholars suggest updating the laws that 
govern third-party disclosure of personal electronic data to more 
realistically mirror the unique features of intangible data.46 
Personal information transmitted via email, including bank and 
hospital records, traverses numerous third-party servers while being 
copied at each juncture.47  Today, data transmitted while using Gmail or 
                                                
45 See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating the government 
attempted to compel disclosure of data located in Ireland); Jason Young Green, Railing against 
Cyber Imperialism:  Discussing the Issues Surrounding the Pending Appeal of United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 172, 187–88 (2015) (discussing the hybrid nature of 
the SCA warrant initially granted in Microsoft); Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation 
Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 376 (2014) [hereinafter Kerr, Next 
Generation] (suggesting Congress enacted the Electronic Communication Privacy Act 
(“ECPA”) in a time when data storage was expensive whereas today, ISPs may store the 
entirety of an individual’s user data for a relatively low cost).  Kerr claims this inversion led 
to mass storage of data which “renders [the] ECPA’s structure exactly backwards for the 
operation of modern computer networks.”  Kerr, Next Generation, supra note 45, at 376. 
46 See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1571 (summarizing the problems caused by the third-
party doctrine within the SCA); see also Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and 
Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005) 
[hereinafter Solove, Codification] (stating the third-party doctrine encompasses companies, 
like Amazon, that store troves of revealing user information).  Solove further posits that 
courts are hesitant to stray from a narrow analysis as to whether particular law enforcement 
practices pose constitutional risks.  Id. at 774.  See Wei Chen Lin, Where Are Your Papers?:  The 
Fourth Amendment, the Stored Communications Act, the Third-Party Doctrine, the Cloud, and 
Encryption, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093, 1127 (2016) (analyzing the arguments for and against 
strong encryption as a data privacy measure); but see Kerr, Third-Party, supra note 34, at 573 
(arguing the third-party doctrine maintains the technological neutrality of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
47 See Simon M. Baker, Unfriending the Stored Communications Act:  How Technological 
Advancement and Legislative Inaction Have Rendered its Protections Obsolete, 22 DEPAUL J. ART, 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 103–104 (2011) (predicting how recent court decisions treating 
opened emails will affect Facebook and MySpace messages as in remote storage); Eric R. 
Hinz, A Distinctionless Distinction:  Why the RCS/ECS Distinction in the Stored Communications 
Act Does Not Work, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 493 (2012) (offering an example of early 
problems with the term storage when a hospital wishes to keep a copy of some electronic 
data for back-up purposes, but does not consider that data in storage).  While the individual 
may wish for this information to remain private, the third-party doctrine removes any 
expectation of privacy.  Id.  See also Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss of 
Something a Lot Like Privacy:  An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and the Limits of the Fourth 
Amendment, 24 SAINT THOMAS L. REV. 169, 240 (2012) [hereinafter Walsh, Mosaic] (suggesting 
Congress enacted the SCA at least in part to counteract increasing government collection of 
personal data).  Today, because the government is capable of numerous and distinct forms 
of surveillance, the data from each of these forms may be aggregated into one singular 
account, much like a mosaic in the world of art.  Id. at 173.  If the government does collect a 
mosaic of information, the Fourth Amendment protects that information.  Id. 
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Facebook is also generally subject to the third-party doctrine.48  The sum 
of an individual’s data usage across all of these services give the 
investigator a “mosaic” of private information.49  Individuals consider 
their personal information as private, not just to other individuals, but also 
to the government.50  Data’s quirks, even in 1986, led Congress to create a 
basic framework of Fourth Amendment protections.51 
B. Enactment of the SCA as Part of the ECPA 
Initial widespread use of the Internet began with businesses using 
desktop or laptop computers connected to private servers.52  Yet, outside 
the office, few people accessed the Internet for non-business reasons or 
even owned personal computers during this time.53  In short, personal 
                                                
48 See Avidan Y. Cover, Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist Fourth Amendment, 
100 IOWA L. REV. 1441, 1445 (2015) (discussing the common email and social media services 
used today that are subject to the third-party doctrine); Daniel Shickich, What Your Tweet 
Doesn’t Say:  Twitter, Non-Content Data, and the Stored Communications Act, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. 
& ARTS 457, 461 (2013) (analyzing privacy expectations when the user completes a clickwrap 
consent form before utilizing Internet services). 
49 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) (“In short, ‘account’ is an 
apt word for the conglomeration of stored messages that comprises an email account, as it 
provides an account of its owner’s life.”); see also Walsh, Mosaic, supra note 47, at 173 
(describing the government’s surveillance capabilities when aggregating data across 
services). 
50 See Hinz, supra note 47, at 489 (introducing privacy concerns from the standpoint of an 
investigation involving the Detroit police department and mayor following the police 
shooting of Tamara Greene in 2003); Jay P. Kesan et al., Information Privacy and Data Control 
in Cloud Computing:  Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 341, 460 (2013) (suggesting data privacy laws should be narrowly tailored to fit specific 
circumstances and predicting reduced privacy expectations for data stored in the cloud). 
51 See supra Part II.B (examining the legislative response to slowly increasing Internet use 
during the time Congress contemplated the SCA). 
52 See Courtney M. Bowman, A Way Forward after Warshak:  Fourth Amendment Protections 
for E-Mail, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809, 825 (2012) (arguing that the SCA was crafted as a bill 
to protect a business convenience, not personal privacy considerations); Sasha Segall, 
Jurisdictional Challenges in the United States Government’s Move to Cloud Computing Technology, 
23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1105, 1115 (2013) (stating that numerous ISPs 
today operate storage facilities outside of the United States); see also Matthew Tokson, 
Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 584 (2011) (examining early 
government use of bank and telephone company records); Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1560 
(discussing that few individuals had home access to the Internet in the 1980s because 
personal computers were large and expensive).  Those that did have access to personal 
computers had minimal options when seeking ISPs.  Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1560; Kerr, 
Global Internet, supra note 24, at 287 (noting initial Internet use in the United States was 
primarily domestic). 
53 See William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?:  Cloud Computing Privacy under the Stored 
Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1197 (2010) (revealing that an IBM mainframe cost $12 
million in 1970); Schultheis, supra note 9, at 666–67 (reporting fourteen percent of Americans 
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Internet usage in 1986 pales in comparison to today.54  Despite its minimal 
usage, individuals and civil rights groups quickly began to voice Internet 
privacy concerns.55  Because the Fourth Amendment protects “people, not 
places,” legislators were at odds in determining whether stored electronic 
communications should be afforded the same reasonable expectation of 
privacy as a telephone booth.56  Particularly, legislators examined 
extending the government’s reach beyond the United States’s borders.57  
                                                
used the Internet in 1995, while sixty-six percent of Americans used the Internet in 2005, and 
eighty-seven percent of Americans used the Internet in 2014). 
54 See Terri A. Cutrera, The Constitution in Cyberspace:  The Fundamental Rights of Computer 
Users, 60 UMKC L. REV. 139, 141 (1991) (marking a sharp increase in hacking activity as 
computer and communications technologies progressed); Robert W. Kastenmeier et al., 
Communications Privacy:  A Legislative Perspective, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 715, 718 (1989) 
(enumerating available communications technologies, such as cordless telephones, paging 
devices, and miniature cameras).  The government wished to protect these communications 
while providing certain exceptions for when the ISP may be subject to disclosure.  Id. at 719.  
See Aaron Smith, 15% of American Adults Have Used Online Dating Sites or Mobile Dating Apps, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/02/11/15-percent-of-
american-adults-have-used-online-dating-sites-or-mobile-dating-apps/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7Q3W-PYE7] (reporting that usage by eighteen to twenty-four year olds has increased nearly 
300% since 2013).  Usage of dating sites or mobile dating apps for fifty-five to sixty-four year 
olds has doubled.  Id. 
55 See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1264, 1274 (2004) [hereinafter Solove, Surveillance Law] (mentioning the government used 
COINTELPRO, an early surveillance program operated with minimal oversight, on Civil 
Rights activists who demanded, among other things, individual privacy); Mulligan, supra 
note 15, at 1561–62 (explaining that before the SCA, stored communications were not 
protected by any federal legislation). 
56 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (defining the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment in terms of telephone communications); S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986) reprinted 
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555 (“Most importantly, the law must advance with the technology to 
ensure the continued vitality of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”); see also Orin S. Kerr, 
Cybercrime’s Scope:  Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1609–10 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Cybercrime] (distinguishing the process 
of identifying property rights of tangible materials to assigning property rights to intangible 
data); but see Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 1209 (explaining email data is traditionally 
stored on the premises of the ISP and not within the home or physical control of the 
individual).  Individual users may believe stored emails to be part of their virtual home, but 
those messages are stored on the premises of the ISP.   Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 
1209.  See also Solove, Surveillance Law, supra note 55, at 1270–71 (noting the surveillance of 
telegraph communications as a guide when Congress contemplated applying the Fourth 
Amendment to online correspondence). 
57 See H.R. Rep. 99–647, at 32–33 (1986) (denying extraterritorial application of the SCA to 
seize data located outside the territorial United States).  The report reflects: 
By the inclusion of the element “affecting (affects) interstate or foreign 
commerce” in these provisions the Committee does not intend that the 
Act regulate activities conducted outside the territorial United States.  
Thus, insofar as the Act regulates the “interception” of communications, 
for example it . . . regulates only those “interceptions” conducted within 
the territorial United States.  Similarly, the controls in [Section 2703] 
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Ultimately, Congress sought to ensure basic privacy rights of individuals 
using electronic communication by enacting the SCA as a subordinate title 
of the ECPA.58 
Three main titles comprise the ECPA:  the Wiretap Act, the Pen 
Register Statute, and the SCA.59  The Wiretap Act oversees the collection 
of content data whereas the Pen Register Statute applies to non-content 
data.60  The Wiretap Act and Pen Register Statute enable the government 
to intercept email content in real time.61  Based on how the data is 
transmitted, § 2703 splits all stored communications data into two 
categories:  electronic communication services (“ECS”) and remote 
computing services (“RCS”).62  Section 2703(a) pertains to the disclosure 
of ECS data while § 2703(b) applies to RCS data.63  An individual uses ECS 
                                                
regarding access to stored wire and electronic communications are 
intended to apply only to access within the territorial United States. 
Id. 
58 See Kerr, Next Generation, supra note 45, at 384 (positing in the 1980s, Congress focused 
on protecting content rather than non-content data).  Unopened messages stored less than 
180 days received the highest protection while non-content received minimal consideration.  
Id. at 384–85.  See also Kerr, Cybercrime, supra note 56, at 1602–03 (offering early court cases 
involving government requests for individual user data primarily involved child 
pornography). 
59 See generally Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012) (authorizing collection of content data 
in criminal investigations); Pen Register Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2012) (permitting 
disclosure of non-content communications in relation to an “ongoing criminal investigation” 
conducted by a governmental agency); § 2703 (allowing compelled disclosure of stored 
communications data). 
60 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (informing the subject 
and body of an email message comprises content data while the addressee, time sent, sender 
location, and other logistical information comprise non-content email data).  Because the 
Wiretap Act authorizes real-time surveillance, a much more detailed warrant is required 
than under the SCA.  Id. at 469.  The distinction blurs between what statute a given search 
warrant, subpoena, or court order falls under when the government wishes to conduct 
multiple forms of surveillance.  Id. 
61 See Kerr, Next Generation, supra note 45, at 376 (stating the majority of privacy 
protections established in the ECPA were aimed at real-time surveillance).  When Congress 
enacted the ECPA, the government primarily conducted surveillance in real-time and rarely 
seized stored information, while today the opposite is true.  Id. 
62 See generally § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider 
of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication, 
that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and 
eighty days or less . . . .”); § 2703(b) (“A governmental entity may require a provider of 
remote computing service to disclose the contents of any wire or electronic 
communication . . . .”). 
63 See § 2703(a) (describing the 180-day time limit); § 2703(b) (allowing compelled 
disclosure of stored data); see also People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 596 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
2012) (finding that Twitter is primarily an electronic communication service (“ECS”) 
provider, and records associated with a Twitter account are subject to subpoena according 
to the SCA); In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214 (D. Or. 2009) (categorizing stored 
emails as data under control of a remote computing service (“RCS”) provider for the 
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when sending and receiving emails and uses RCS to store messages once 
they are opened.64  The type of service provided and whether the data has 
been in storage for more than 180 days determines what mechanism the 
government must employ to compel disclosure under § 2703.65 
Section 2703 erects a tapering system controlling the conditions under 
which ISPs must disclose data to the government.66  First, the government 
may seek basic user and transactional information with an administrative 
subpoena authorized by § 2703(c).67  Second, non-content records may be 
obtained by a court order found in § 2703(d).68  To obtain this court order, 
the government must demonstrate “specific and articulable facts” 
showing there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the information in 
question is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation” 
rather than probable cause.69  Also according to § 2703(d), the government 
                                                
purposes of determining the appropriate mechanism to employ under the SCA); Hinz, supra 
note 47, at 515 (mentioning many interfaces today combine ECS and RCS services, making 
classification of messages difficult).  Hinz offers the example of two professors collaborating 
on a single document saved in Dropbox.  Hinz, supra note 47, at 515.  The professors each use 
a RCS to store the document and an ECS to make edits over the Internet.  Id. 
64 See Hinz, supra note 47, at 496 (establishing the process of sending and receiving an 
email involves electronic computing services while remote computing services store the 
message once the message is read and stored). 
65 See Backer, supra note 18, at 390 (stating the greatest level of protection available is for 
electronic communications stored in an ECS for less than 180 days); see also Hinz, supra note 
47, at 496 (explaining since the SCA only distinguishes between ECS and RCS providers 
despite numerous technological advances since 1986, courts must determine what type of 
service requires what level of privacy protection on a case by case basis).  An ISP may offer 
both ECS and RCS services, so while during an exchange the ISP may stay the same, the legal 
requirements of that ISPs conduct in handling data change when the nature of the service 
switches from ECS to RCS.  Hinz, supra note 47, at 496.  For example, per the SCA, ISPs may 
not voluntarily disclose ECS data to other parties at any time; whereas, ISPs are prohibited 
from disclosing RCS data only if that ISP is not allowed to access the communication for 
reasons other than storage and processing.  Id. 
66 See generally § 2703 (creating three tiers of data available via disclosure under the SCA); 
see also Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2016) (summarizing the 
methods by which the government may compel disclosure of minimally distinct types of 
data under the SCA). 
67 See § 2703(c)(1)(a) (requiring an ISP to disclose “a record or other information pertaining 
to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . only when the governmental entity:  obtains 
a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure . . . .”). 
68 See § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be 
issued . . . if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that . . . the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”). 
69 See id. (enumerating the specific and articulable facts standard); see also Kaitlin G. 
Klamann, Show Me the Warrant:  Protection of Stored Electronic Communications in New York 
State, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1407, 1422 (2014) (explaining that the distinctions found in the 
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may seek some user content with a subpoena under § 2703(c)(2) or a 
§ 2703(d) order provided the government gives notice to the ISP’s 
customer.70  Finally, the government may obtain “priority stored 
communications”—stored communications held by the ISP for less than 
180 days and stored communications in storage for more than 180 days—
the government must prove probable cause and obtain a search warrant 
authorized by § 2703(a), unless the government is seeking data older than 
180 days and provides notice to the customer.71 
Warrants authorized by § 2703(a) are subject to the F.R.C.P., while 
subpoenas and court orders found in §§ 2703(b) and 2703(c) are not.72  
                                                
SCA turn on the type of service provider and the status of the data, i.e., whether an email has 
been opened); Backer, supra note 18, at 399 (criticizing the specific and articulable facts 
standard); Schultheis, supra note 9, at 669 (citing limited distinctions between the function of 
an SCA warrant and an ordinary subpoena). 
70 See § 2703(b)(1) (allowing disclosure with or without notice to the customer).  The 
statute states: 
A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing 
service to disclose the contents of any wire or electronic 
communication . . . without required notice to the subscriber or 
customer . . . or with prior notice from the governmental entity to the 
subscriber or customer if the governmental entity:  uses an 
administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a 
Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena[.] 
Id. See also § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be 
issued . . . if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that . . . the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”). 
71 See § 2703(a) (providing the warrant provision of the SCA’s disclosure capabilities).  The 
statute states: 
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of 
electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic 
communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only 
pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, 
issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.  A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a 
provider of electronic communications services of the contents of a wire 
or electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for more than one hundred and 
eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) of this section. 
Id.  See § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i) (“A governmental entity may require a provider of remote 
computing service to disclose the contents of any wire or electronic 
communication . . . without required notice to the subscriber or customer . . . .”); Microsoft 
Corp., 829 F.3d at 207 (summarizing binary relationship between content and non-content 
stored data). 
72 See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, at 222 (requiring the warrant to comply with the 
traditional notions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); § 2703(d) (“A court order for 
disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued . . . if the governmental entity offers 
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Generally, warrants are subject to more geographic limitations than 
subpoenas and court orders.73  In short, SCA subpoenas and court orders 
are usually served via fax on the ISP, thereby creating a legal duty upon 
the ISP to surrender the requested data to the government, eliminating the 
need for an agent to ever step foot on the premises of the storage facility.74  
The SCA, while generally applicable to all stored data, does not authorize 
extraterritorial application of any of its mechanisms that compel 
disclosure.75  However, a plain text reading of the statute does not readily 
answer whether court orders issued under § 2703(d) are also subject to the 
Federal Rules, and therefore, a review of relevant case law is in order.76 
C. Warshak and Microsoft 
Before the Internet connected the world, Fourth Amendment 
questions primarily involved geographic considerations.77  Cases 
involving the required disclosure of email data authorized by 
extraterritorial application of the SCA are remarkably scarce.78  In 2010, 
                                                
specific and articulable facts showing that . . . the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”); see also 
§ 2703(b)(1)(B)(i) (allowing the government to “require a provider of remote computing 
service to disclose the contents of any wire or electronic communication . . . without required 
notice to the subscriber or customer . . . or with prior notice from the governmental 
entity . . . .“). 
73 See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 210 (following the presumption against extraterritoriality 
advanced in Morrison). 
74 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 471 (declaring SCA orders function more 
like subpoenas than traditional search warrants). 
75 See generally § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure . . . of the 
contents . . . in electronic storage . . . .”); In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 468 (finding 
that § 2703 applies to the communications services Microsoft provides). 
76 See § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be 
issued . . . if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that . . . the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”); Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 214 (stating ordinary subpoenas may 
require production of materials located abroad).  Warrants and subpoenas are separate legal 
instruments.  Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 214.  The warrant in Microsoft cited § 2703(a), not 
§ 2703(d), making it a SCA warrant, not a court order or subpoena.  Id. at 200. 
77 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (reviewing case law utilizing territorial 
analyses); Andrew Tyler Ohlert, Appealing to Reason-able Expectations of Privacy:  Increasing 
Appellate Review under ECPA, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1731, 1746 (2015) (finding that generally very 
few cases examine the SCA or ECPA).  Many forms of modern surveillance are conducted in 
secret and this threatens the legitimacy of judicial review.  Ohlert, supra note 77, at 1746. 
78 See State v. Rose, 330 P.3d 680, 688 (Or. App. 2014) (upholding a SCA court order to 
compel the ISP to surrender the email data located in California).  In Rose, Oregon law 
enforcement officials sought to enforce a state-issued search warrant to seize email data 
located in California in relation to a child pornography investigation.  Id. at 682.  While the 
warrant was not issued under authority of the SCA, the court mentions the Act in relation to 
whether a state court may issue an order similar to a § 2703(d) court order.  Id. at 684.  Because 
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however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v. 
Warshak, that the government violated the Fourth Amendment by 
compelling an ISP to produce email data without first obtaining a 
warrant.79  In Warshak, the government moved to present email data 
seized under the SCA as evidence in relation to a fraud investigation.80  
Warshak moved to quash the motion because the government seized the 
data without first satisfying the Fourth Amendment probable cause 
requirement.81  The court likened an ISP to a post office or telephone 
company, and thus, the government was otherwise forbidden from 
unwarranted snooping on an individual.82  Warshak held § 2703(d) was 
unconstitutional because it allows disclosure of email data without 
requiring probable cause.83  Generally, the standard of proof that the 
government is required to show increases from reasonable suspicion to 
probable cause based on a general balancing test between law and order 
                                                
an Oregon statute created a mechanism for the process of interstate warrants similar to the 
SCA, the court upheld the warrant and compelled the ISP to retrieve the data from California.  
Id. at 686.  In upholding the warrant, the court noted that the warrant under Oregon law was 
sufficiently particular.  Id. at 688.  See also Mark Wilson, Comment, Castle in the Cloud:  
Modernizing Constitutional Protections for Cloud-Stored Data on Mobile Devices, 43 GOLDEN 
GATE U.L. REV. 261, 277 (2013) (demonstrating that electronic storage is an uncertain term). 
79 See 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding the Fourth Amendment applies to email 
correspondence); see also Bowman, supra note 52, at 835 (arguing that the language of the 
SCA coupled with loose judicial interpretation thereof lead to unconstitutional application 
of the SCA). 
80 See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 290–91 (describing the investigation and the compelled 
disclosure by the email provider NuVox). 
81 See id. at 283–84 (summarizing Warshak’s constitutional defense that email 
communications are private). 
82 See id. at 286 (discussing the similarities between an ISP and a post office or telephone 
company and the constitutional protections thereof).  While technically a third party, the 
court distinguished an ISP from a bank in Miller because a bank is an intended recipient, 
while an ISP is merely an intermediary.  Id. at 288.  See also Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum 
Game:  How to Increase the Productivity of the Fourth Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
549, 555 (2013) (utilizing a formula for privacy invasions similar to the Learned Hand 
Balancing test involving negligence). 
83 See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 290 (concluding that the SCA violates the Fourth Amendment, 
but electing not to reverse the lower court’s conviction of Warshak due to harmless error). 
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and the individual’s right to privacy.84  This expectation of privacy found 
in Warshak, however, is only binding law within the Sixth Circuit.85 
Microsoft catalyzed the debate of the government’s territorial reach of 
stored data in criminal investigations and elevated the issue to the world 
stage.86  In Microsoft, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) petitioned for and 
received a warrant authorized by § 2703(a) to obtain email data linked to 
an unnamed individual under the control of Microsoft in relation to an 
ongoing narcotics investigation in December 2013.87  Microsoft moved to 
quash the warrant, claiming that the authority of the SCA does not extend 
                                                
84 See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
granting SCA warrants to collect cell site location information (“CSLI”) based on the 
reasonable and articulable facts standard is not per se unconstitutional under the third-party 
doctrine); In re Application of U.S., 733 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (requiring a 
showing of probable cause for a warrant to obtain CSLI); In re U.S. for Orders Authorizing 
Installation and Use, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396–97 (D. Md. 2006) (holding that probable cause 
was required for pen register data because non-content data can amount to location tracking 
similar to GPS).  The government requested pen register data that may be used to determine 
an individual’s past location using cellular tower triangulation.  In re U.S. for Orders 
Authorizing Installation and Use, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 392.  The court then cryptically mused the 
hybrid authority of the SCA warrant is “at best murky and, at worst, illusory.”  Id. at 396.  
See generally Daniel Solove, How Justice Scalia Defended Your Digital Privacy—and Also Held It 
Back, VICE NEWS (Feb. 16, 2016), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/justice-scalia-digital-
privacy-and-the-third-party-doctrine [https://perma.cc/2QZK-Q4M3] [hereinafter Solove, 
Justice Scalia] (positing as a constitutional originalist, Justice Scalia believed that GPS tracking 
constituted a search, while disclosure of third-party data did not). 
85 See Backer, supra note 18, at 392 (stating that Warshak appealed to the Sixth Circuit); see 
also Bowman, supra note 52, at 820 (summarizing constitutional considerations for not 
requiring probable cause to require disclosure of emails stored more than 180 days). 
86 Stempel, supra note 17 (hailing the Microsoft appeal as a “landmark” victory for privacy 
advocates). 
87 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (identifying the type 
of warrant in question as authorized by § 2703(a) of the SCA).  The court likened this warrant 
to a subpoena and found the government may compel disclosure of the data located in 
Dublin.  Id. at 472.  But see Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled 
and Maintained by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 230 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, 
concurring) (noting on appeal that the nationality of the suspect—under investigation and 
tied to the relevant email account—was unknown).  Further, those that are not U.S. citizens, 
or U.S. citizens that claim they reside outside of the United States, stand to gain the most 
from the majority ruling.  Id. at 224.  Since the government could never compel Microsoft to 
disclose data located abroad, those individuals received an “absolute” protection.  Id.  See 
also Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 781 (2016) 
(discussing the interests of foreign governments if the tables were turned in a future 
Microsoft scenario).  Woods argues that U.S. ISPs should be allowed to disclose data stored 
in the United States and linked to a non-U.S. citizen to a foreign government under specific 
conditions.  Id.  But see Cox, supra note 1 (noting that many suspect the individual at the 
center of the Microsoft dispute to be an operator of Silk Road, a black market available on 
the dark web). 
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beyond the United States’s territorial borders.88  The DOJ claimed that the 
function of the SCA warrant did not involve extraterritorial searches or 
seizures.89  The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York upheld the warrant and ordered Microsoft to disclose the 
enumerated email data in August of 2014.90  In July of 2016, the Second 
Circuit overturned the decision upholding extraterritorial application of 
the warrant.91 
On appeal, Microsoft strictly followed the Morrison doctrine against 
extraterritoriality and invalidated the warrant.92  In doing so, the court 
determined the “Act’s privacy provisions were its impetus and focus” and 
that the needs of law enforcement were not the “primary motivator for the 
enactment.”93  Also, the court directed the government to adhere to the 
                                                
88 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 470 (conveying Microsoft’s argument that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality prohibits courts from applying the SCA outside 
of U.S. borders). 
89 See id. at 470 (concluding the debate centers around whether a search takes place with 
SCA warrants). 
90 See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., No. 13-MJ-2814, 2014 WL 4629624, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (upholding the SCA 
warrant on appeal and providing minimal further analysis on the issues of probable cause 
or extraterritoriality); Sam Thielman, Microsoft Case:  DOJ Says It Can Demand Every Email 
from Any U.S.-Based Provider, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2015/sep/09/microsoft-court-case-hotmail-ireland-search-warrant 
[https://perma.cc/RK3T-U6WN] [hereinafter Thielman, Microsoft Case] (acknowledging 
that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) contends the emails in question resemble business 
records subject to disclosure under the third-party doctrine). 
91 See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that Congress 
did not endorse extraterritorial application of SCA warrants); Stempel, supra note 17 
(detailing the reversal of the SCA warrant in Microsoft).  Before the appellate decision, 
Microsoft warned that upholding the warrant could “spark a global ‘free-for-all’ that 
would . . . [prompt] law enforcement authorities elsewhere [to] seize emails belonging to 
Americans and stored in the United States.”  Stempel, supra note 17.  See also Lindsay La 
Marca, Note, I Got 99 Problems and a Warrant Is One:  How Current Interpretations of the Stored 
Communications Act Offend International Comity, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 971, 995 (2016) (arguing 
that courts should look to the physical location of the data in determining whether the 
government may compel disclosure); Alexander Dugas Battey Jr., A Step in the Wrong 
Direction:  The Case for Restraining the Extraterritorial Application of the Stored Communications 
Act, 42 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 262, 292–93 (2016) (suggesting the warrant 
requirement found in the Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad (“LEADS”) Act to 
be incorporated into the SCA). 
92 See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, at 210 (following the two-pronged test in Morrison 
wherein the court first decides “whether the relevant statutory provisions contemplate 
extraterritorial application”).  Second, if the court finds that the provision does not consider 
extraterritorial application, the court then decides if the challenged conduct qualifies as 
“extraterritorial.”  Id.  If the conduct is extraterritorial, it is outside the bounds of the statute.  
Id. 
93 See id. at 222 (concluding the focus of the SCA after reviewing its warrant provisions, 
other sections of the statute, and accompanying legislative history). 
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already-established mutual legal assistance treaty (“MLAT”) processes in 
the interest of international comity.94  Finally, and perhaps most 
remarkably, the Second Circuit acknowledged the intrusive third-party 
doctrine and derived from the legislative history of the SCA that Congress 
intended the Fourth Amendment to reign supreme.95 
Much of the debate on Microsoft centers on specific language within 
the SCA.96  Before its appeal, Microsoft captured the attention of ISPs, 
telecommunications companies, privacy advocates, and supporters of 
international law.97  Compounded with the classified and controversial 
information leaked by National Security Agency (“NSA”) analyst Edward 
Snowden in 2013, scholars and journalists alike cite growing concern for 
                                                
94 See id. at 221 (deferring to the international law enforcement framework of mutual legal 
assistance treaty (“MLAT”) procedures); Daskal, supra note 9, at 395 (examining commonly 
suggested jurisdictional Fourth Amendment triggers such as national origin or crime 
alleged). 
95 See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, at 214 (“When the government compels a private party 
to assist it in conducting a search or seizure, the private party becomes an agent of the 
government, and the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause applies in full force to the private 
party’s actions.”); but see Joseph Schrempp, In Re Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account:  
A Victory for Privacy in the Face of a New Technological World, 19 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
223, 235 (2016) (analyzing the privacy victory in Microsoft as a possible tool criminals could 
use to evade law enforcement investigations in the future). 
96 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (countering ambiguity 
within the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) with the need to facilitate law enforcement activities).  
Many email service providers do not verify the identity of an individual creating an account.  
Id. at 474. 
97 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, Surveillance and Digital Privacy in the Transatlantic ‘War on 
Terror”:  The Case for a Global Privacy Regime, 47 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 1, 44 (2016) 
(stating Microsoft offered to store Europeans’ data in Germany in November of 2015).  
Microsoft designed this protocol to keep Europeans’ data out of the U.S. government’s reach 
in the wake of the Southern District of New York’s opinion in Microsoft.  Id.  See also Steven 
R. Swanson, Google Sets Sail:  Ocean-Based Server Farms and International Law, 43 CONN. L. REV. 
709, 712 (2011) (examining the rise of server farms within the context of Pirate Bay wishing 
to avoid territorial laws); John Markoff, Microsoft Plumbs Ocean’s Depths to Test Underwater 
Data Center, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/technology/ 
microsoft-plumbs-oceans-depths-to-test-underwater-data-center.html [https://perma.cc/ 
K2V8-4U5M] (reporting that Microsoft is testing an innovative underwater storage center off 
the coast of California that uses oceanic current to power and cool blocks of storage 
equipment); but see In re Search Warrant No. 16–960–M–01 to Google, No. 16-1061-M, 2017 
WL 471564, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2017) (deviating from the holding in Microsoft and finding 
that because the investigative conduct relevant to the SCA occurs within the United States, 
no principles of extraterritoriality are implicated).  The court also declined to follow Microsoft 
in order to not “run afoul of principles of comity and also presents a commonsense 
interpretation of the SCA which will not lead to absurd results.”  Id.  Elsevier, Inc. v. 
Grossman, No. 12 CIV 5121 (KPF), 2016 WL 7077109, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016) (following 
the second prong of the two-prong test advanced in Morrison and utilized by Microsoft in 
deciding whether the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) 
investigation at issue involved extraterritorial implications). 
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data privacy and more generally, individual liberty.98  As a result, 
individuals, civil rights groups, and the states themselves are watching 
the federal government’s actions closely with respect to surveillance 
practices involving domestic and international implications.99 
                                                
98 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers 
Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-
phone-records-verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/PP53-ASJU] (revealing widespread 
and covert collection of cellular telephone data by the National Security Agency (“NSA”) on 
behalf of the United States government); Dan Froomkin, Edward Snowden is on Twitter:  
@Snowden, INTERCEPT (Sept. 29, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/09/29/edward-
snowden-twitter-snowden/ [https://perma.cc/98LG-QXQ6] [hereinafter Froomkin, 
@Snowden] (announcing former NSA analyst Edward Snowden created a Twitter account to 
more directly address nefarious surveillance practices by, among others, the U.S. 
government); Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/6HQX-ZX24] (publishing an 
open letter available to the general public on February 16, 2016 in response to the 
government’s request for Apple to create new code to unlock an iPhone used by one of the 
San Bernardino shooters).  The letter warns: 
The implications of the government’s demands are chilling.  If the 
government can use the All Writs Act to make it easier to unlock your 
iPhone, it would have the power to reach into anyone’s device to 
capture their data.  The government could extend this breach of privacy 
and demand that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your 
messages, access your health records or financial data, track your 
location, or even access your phone’s microphone or camera without 
your knowledge. 
Cook, supra note 98.  But see Katie Benner, U.S. Says It Has Unlocked iPhone without Apple, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/technology/apple-iphone-
fbi-justice-department-case.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/F8K6-TK7S] (alluding to other 
ongoing cases involving the government seeking data stored on locked iPhones that suggest 
the issue is likely to materialize again); Clark D. Cunningham, Apple and the American 
Revolution: Remembering Why We Have the Fourth Amendment, 126 YALE L.J. F. 216, 225 (2016) 
(detailing the amount of data requested by the government in Microsoft and connecting email 
searches to phone searches). 
99 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B) (2012) [hereinafter PATRIOT 
Act] (prescribing to obtain a warrant to seize foreign tangible things the government must 
produce “a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized [foreign intelligence and international 
terrorism] investigation . . . .”); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014) (stating that 
the locking function on modern smartphones is a strong security feature).  The Supreme 
Court found that, incident to an arrest, the police may not search the contents of an 
individual’s cell phone without first obtaining a warrant.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.  See also 
Elizabeth Atkins, Spying on Americans:  At What Point Does the NSA’s Collection and Searching 
of Metadata Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 51, 76–77 (2014) 
(discussing the reduced standard of proof under the PATRIOT Act); Brett Weinstein, Legal 
Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 217, 222 
(2015) (discussing the negative public response to National Security Letters that function 
similar to SCA warrants); Dan Froomkin, USA Freedom Act:  Small Step for Post-Snowden 
Reform, Giant Leap for Congress, INTERCEPT (June 2, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/06/ 
02/one-small-step-toward-post-snowden-surveillance-reform-one-giant-step-congress/ 
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D. New Legislation on the Block:  the CalECPA 
Recently, individual states, such as California, have addressed matters 
regarding electronic communications privacy.100  The main goal of 
California’s legislation is to ensure that law enforcement must obtain a 
warrant based on probable cause before obtaining electronic 
communication information or electronic device information.101  
California enacted the CalECPA in response to data privacy concerns 
posed in Microsoft, and the bill contains both strengths and weaknesses.102 
                                                
[https://perma.cc/G4HF-MPSG] (reporting the revision of the controversial PATRIOT Act 
ends fourteen years of bulk collection of cell phone records while reauthorizing other 
controversial provisions allowing the collection of business records).  These amendments 
accomplish “absolutely nothing to restrain the vast majority of the intrusive surveillance 
revealed by Snowden.”  Froomkin, supra note 99. 
100 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 168/10 (2016) (requiring a court order based on probable 
cause for law enforcement to obtain cell phone location information on an individual during 
a criminal investigation); IND. CODE § 35-33-5-11(a) (2016) (prohibiting seizure of individual 
user data for surveillance without a warrant); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE § 10-408(a)(1)(iv) 
(2015) (requiring a court order based on probable cause for law enforcement to obtain 
location information based on cell phones or other devices on an individual during a criminal 
investigation); MINN. STAT. § 626A.42(2) (2015) (prohibiting the use of cell phone location 
information in a criminal investigation without a warrant based on probable cause); MONT. 
CODE § 46-5-110 (2015) (providing that a government entity must obtain a search warrant 
before obtaining location information of an electronic device, and providing a civil penalty 
for wrongful invasions); TENN. CODE § 39-13-610(c) (2016) (prohibiting a governmental entity 
or law enforcement agency from obtaining the location information of an electronic device 
without a search warrant except under certain circumstances); see also Randall T. Shepard, 
The Maturing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 424 (1996) 
(discussing imbalances of rights between the state and federal levels); Sen. Mark Leno & Sen. 
Joel Anderson, California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, (CalECPA)—SB 178, ACLU 
OF N. CAL. (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.aclunc.org/our-work/legislation/calecpa 
[https://perma.cc/V7CE-UENG] (introducing the CalECPA as revolutionary for 
communications privacy in California). 
101 See New CA Poll:  Voters Concerned about Digital Privacy, Support Efforts to Increase 
Protections from Warrantless Searches, ACLU OF N. CAL. (Sept. 2, 2015), 
https://aclunc.org/news/new-ca-poll-voters-concerned-about-digital-privacy-support-
efforts-increase-protections [https://perma.cc/KT69-GAUX] [hereinafter ACLU Poll]  
(presenting polling data that indicates public desire for increased electronic communications 
privacy, that companies like Google and Microsoft receive many government requests for 
data each year, and scholarship raising concerns that granting such requests under the 
outdated SCA threatens constitutional trends seen in SCA case law); Kim Zetter, California 
Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED (October 8, 2015), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/MW3V-D83H] (highlighting the potential that the CalECPA has to 
bolster privacy expectations). 
102 See infra Part III.C (examining the merits of CalECPA within the context of Microsoft). 
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Numerous interest groups collaborated to make the CalECPA a 
reality.103  Individuals expressed a desire for increased privacy rights.104  
Law enforcement officials wanted to provide essential emergency services 
without violating the Constitution.105  Technology corporations did not 
want to lose business when customers fled to encrypted or foreign 
competitors.106  The language of the statute provides some guidance in the 
wake of the Microsoft debate.107 
The CalECPA contains numerous specific definitions that more 
accurately reflect the current landscape of available methods of electronic 
communications.108  Also, CalECPA section 1546.1(d)(2) requires law 
enforcement to prove probable cause before obtaining electronic 
communications information without assigning differing requisite 
                                                
103 See Landmark, supra note 19 (interpreting the California legislature’s swift action as a 
strong desire for data privacy assurances); ACLU Poll, supra note 101 (reporting AT&T 
received over 64,000 government demands for customer data in 2014); see also Magid, supra 
note 19 (referring to the interests of law enforcement officials as well as individual families 
in protecting children from online abuse). 
104 See ACLU Poll, supra note 101 (laying out results of a poll offered to the public regarding 
data privacy).  Before the CalECPA’s enactment, the ACLU conducted a statewide poll in 
California that indicated a public desire for increased electronic privacy protections.  Id.  
First, eighty-two percent of Californians responded that the police should have a warrant 
before searching digital information.  Id.  Second, seventy-nine percent supported a warrant 
requirement for tracking cell phone activity.  Id.  Third, seventy-seven percent believed text 
messages deserve the warrant requirement as well.  Id. 
105 See id. (mentioning law enforcement has incentive to adopt bright-line definitions 
regarding data seizure); see also Colleen Curry, U.S. Cops Aren’t Getting Warrants to Spy on 
People’s Cellphones for Petty Crimes, VICE NEWS (Aug. 25, 2015), https://news.vice.com/ 
article/us-cops-arent-getting-warrants-to-spy-on-peoples-cellphones-for-petty-crimes?utm 
_source=vicenewsfb [https://perma.cc/6965-WASP] (finding that police use a device 
known as a “stingray” that mimics a cell tower to intercept an individual’s data without his 
knowledge).  However, a stingray also collects other individuals’ cell phone data 
indiscriminately.  Curry, supra note 105.  Further, there is question in numerous jurisdictions 
as to whether the police are obtaining warrants before using stingrays.  Id. 
106 See Markoff, supra note 97 (introducing Microsoft’s plans to store customer data in state-
of-the-art underwater data storage facilities off the coast of California to increase customer 
privacy); ACLU Poll, supra note 101 (noting citizens’ interest in privacy regarding their text 
messages and cell phones). 
107 See supra Part II.D (reviewing language in the CalECPA that assists in resolving the 
extraterritoriality and standard of proof concerns exhibited in Microsoft). 
108 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546(c) (2016) (defining electronic communication as:  “the 
transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature in 
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system”); 
§ 1546(d) (defining electronic communication information as:  “any information about an 
electronic communication . . . including[] . . . the contents, sender, recipients, format, or 
location of the sender or recipients at any point during the communication . . .”); § 1546(e) 
(defining electronic communication service as:  “a service that provides to its subscribers or 
users the ability to send or receive electronic communications, including any service that acts 
as an intermediary in the transmission of electronic communications, or stores electronic 
communication information”). 
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standards of proof based on the 180-day distinction seen in the SCA.109  
Instead, all warrants seeking electronic communication data require 
probable cause consistent with the Fourth Amendment, regardless of time 
in storage.110  This measure eliminates concerns over the time limit 
imposed in the SCA that scholars claim is arbitrary.111  Further the 
CalECPA generally prohibits required disclosure, subject to limited 
exceptions and also generally requires notice.112  However, § 1546.1(d)(3) 
more generally limits the territorial reach of the CalECPA in a manner 
similar to § 2703(a) of the SCA.113 
                                                
109 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a 
provider of electronic communications services of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic communications system 
for more than one hundred and eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) of 
this section.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1) (2016) (“Except as provided in this section, a 
government entity shall not do any of the following:  [c]ompel the production of or access to 
electronic communication information from a service provider.”); § 1546.1(d)(2) (“A court 
shall issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the 
information is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by 
state or federal law.”). 
110 Compare U.S. Const. amend. IV (mandating that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”), with § 1546.1(d)(1) (“The warrant shall 
describe with particularity the information to be seized by specifying the time periods 
covered and, as appropriate and reasonable, the target individuals or accounts, the 
applications or services covered, and the types of information sought.”); see also Kerr, User’s 
Guide supra note 10, at 1234 (advancing further privacy protections to RCS and ECS data in 
storage for more than 180 days). 
111 See Backer, supra note 18, at 396 (suggesting that all email is subject to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in Katz); Hinz, supra note 47, at 521 (summarizing a recent proposal 
by Senator Patrick Leahy to eliminate the 180-day distinction within the SCA and require a 
warrant for compelled disclosure of any ECS content no matter the time in storage). 
112 See § 1546.1(c)(5) (“[i]f the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency 
involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires access to the 
electronic device information . . . .”); § 1546.1(c)(6) (“[i]f the government entity, in good faith, 
believes the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the entity shall only access 
electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify, or contact the owner or 
authorized possessor of the device . . . .”); § 1546.2(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this 
section, any government entity that executes a warrant[] . . . shall serve upon[] . . . the 
identified targets of the warrant or emergency access, a notice that informs the recipient that 
information about the recipient has been compelled or obtained . . . .”). 
113 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the 
disclosure . . . only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . .”), with § 1546.1(d)(3) (“The warrant shall comply 
with all other provisions of California and federal law, including any provisions prohibiting, 
limiting, or imposing additional requirements on the use of search warrants.”); see also  CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1546.1(b)(4) (2016) (providing the government may compel production of or 
access to electronic information from an ISP “[p]ursuant to a subpoena issued pursuant to 
existing state law, provided that the information is not sought for the purpose of 
investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense, and compelling the production of or access 
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One alternative to adopting the language of the CalECPA in resolving 
concerns over Microsoft that is important to consider is a recent 
amendment to Rule 41 of the F.R.C.P.114  Rule 41(b)(6)(a) allows a district 
judge to authorize remote access of electronic storage media located 
within or outside that district in situations where technological means 
have been used to conceal the location of the storage media.115  Criticism 
of the SCA, individual state data privacy legislation, and an amendment 
to the F.R.C.P. indicate a problem exists with data privacy.116 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Recent discussion following Microsoft leaves a key issue regarding 
data privacy unresolved.117  The reversing opinion only addressed the 
territorial reach of “warrants” authorized by SCA § 2703(a) but not other 
available court orders described in § 2703(d).118  This distinction is 
                                                
to the information via the subpoena is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law”); see 
also Bryan R. Kelly, #privacyprotection:  How the United States Can Get Its Head out of the Sand 
and into the Clouds to Secure Fourth Amendment Protections for Cloud Journalists, 55 Washburn 
L.J. 669, 697 (2016) (suggesting Congress model its updated SCA after the newly-enacted 
CalECPA). 
114 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (2016) (allowing extraterritorial disclosure of data by ISPs 
to the government).  The amendment adds: 
[A] magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities 
related to a crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to 
use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy 
electronically stored information located within or outside that district 
if:  (a) the district where the media or information is located has been 
concealed through technological means; or (b) in an investigation of a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), the media are protected computers 
that have been damaged without authorization and are located in five 
or more districts. 
Id.  See also Zach Lerner, A Warrant to Hack:  An Analysis of the Proposed Amendments to Rule 41 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 26, 30 (2016) (advancing the 
goal of amending Rule 41 is to remove unnecessary obstacles to effective law enforcement 
investigations involving digital crimes).  However, critics of Proposed Rule 41 believe 
amending this rule would remove transparency from the government’s investigation.  Id. at 
43. 
115 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (“A magistrate judge with authority in any district where 
activities related to a crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to use remote 
access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored 
information located within or outside that district . . . .”). 
116 See infra Part III.A (exploring dissonance between the Fourth Amendment in terms of 
SCA disclosure). 
117 See Green, supra note 45, at 187–88 (summarizing the parties’ positions in the lower 
court opinion in Microsoft). 
118 See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 220 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding Congress 
intended the SCA warrant to entail domestic limitations when enacting the SCA); Shickich, 
Tuinenga: Log in to Danger Zone: Data Privacy Under The SCA and Microsoft
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
316 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51 
important because warrants authorized by § 2703(a) require the 
government to prove probable cause and are subject to the geographic 
limitations of the F.R.C.P., whereas court orders prescribed in § 2703(d) 
are available through the specific and articulable facts standard, and not 
constrained by the physical boundaries of the F.R.C.P.119  While warrants 
seeking email data less than 180 days old are now deservedly limited 
geographically, non-content data should be considered in the analysis as 
well.120  Individual states, like California, are enacting legislation to 
remedy these concerns, but state-based legislation does not address 
communications privacy on a federal level.121 
First, Part III.A examines the SCA under emerging paradigms of the 
Fourth Amendment.122  Next, Part III.B analyzes current interests omitted 
from the Microsoft decision.123  Part III.C then assesses the CalECPA and 
its detailed language as a possible solution to those interests impinged on 
by Microsoft.124  Finally, Part III.D offers a solution to both the standard of 
proof and extraterritorial application dilemmas following Microsoft by 
proposing an amendment to § 2703(d).125 
A. Revisiting the SCA and the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Data 
Email data, data stored in the cloud, social media records, and 
information transmitted from wearable health technology is subject to 
                                                
supra note 48, at 462 (observing that § 2703 governs compelled disclosure of content and non-
content data). 
119 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the 
disclosure . . . only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . .”), with § 2703(d) (“A court order . . . may be issued 
by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental 
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that . . . the contents . . . are relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”); see also In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 
3d 466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (admitting that § 2703(a) ambiguously refers to the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”).  Two interpretations are possible:  first, § 2703(a) could 
be interpreted to incorporate the geographic limitations included in F.R.C.P. 41; and second, 
Congress intended some procedural aspects of § 2703(a) to apply to investigations, while 
other “more substantive rules are derived from other sources.”  In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. 
Supp. 3d at 470. 
120 See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 222 (holding Congress did not intend for SCA warrants 
to apply extraterritorially). 
121 See infra Part III.C (concluding that protections created by the CalECPA do not override 
the SCA in federal investigations). 
122 See infra Part III.A (exploring current problems with SCA disclosure regarding the 
Fourth Amendment). 
123 See infra Part III.B (discussing the unresolved questions left from Microsoft). 
124 See infra Part III.C (examining the CalECPA’s strengths and weaknesses). 
125 See infra Part III.D (proposing amendment to § 2703(d)). 
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required disclosure according to a statute contemplated in the 1980s.126  
The standard of proof of anything, “relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation” is a lower threshold for the government to meet 
when seeking older, stored email content compared with probable cause, 
which is the standard when seeking access to correspondence sent 
through the ordinary mail.127  Ambiguity within the text of the Act further 
compounds privacy concerns.128  While individuals enjoy more defined 
privacy expectations regarding their email content following Microsoft, 
older emails and non-content data remain there for the taking.129 
If the requirement of probable cause is ambiguous within the text of 
the statute, further difficulties manifest when courts are forced to 
arbitrarily assign standards of proof to the limited technological 
distinctions within the SCA.130  Section 2703 especially lumps all Internet 
activity into two categories, ECS and RCS.131  With § 2703(a), the 
                                                
126 See Daskal, supra note 9, at 366 (stating that records of FaceTime and Google Chats, as 
well as non-content information like recipient logs, are subject to the provisions of the SCA); 
Langley, supra note 9, at 1644 (summarizing how products, such as Fitbit, monitor and store 
data related to the user’s respiratory rate, skin temperature, and heart rate); see also 
Schultheis, supra note 9, at 683 (suggesting that data stored in the cloud is at increased risk 
following interpretations of the SCA as seen in Microsoft). 
127 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (“A court order . . . may be issued by any court that is a 
court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific 
and articulable facts showing that . . . the contents . . . are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.”); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (finding that email subscribers enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding 
their email content). 
128 See § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure . . . only pursuant to 
a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure . . . .”); see also In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)  
(admitting that the text of the SCA is ambiguous as to whether the ordinary physical 
boundaries of the F.R.C.P. apply to the warrant provision in § 2703(a)); Backer, supra note 18, 
at 380 (lamenting ambiguity within the SCA led the government to seek vast amounts of user 
data without proving probable cause). 
129 Compare Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (prescribing Fourth Amendment protections to email 
correspondence despite the lower standard of proof in the SCA), with Matter of Warrant to 
Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp. v. United 
States, 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding Congress did not intend for the SCA to apply 
extraterritorially for warrants but not subpoenas or court orders on appeal); see also Backer, 
supra note 18, at 398 (expressing desire that the Supreme Court afford Fourth Amendment 
protections to email correspondence). 
130 See Compare United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (App. Armed Forces 1996) 
(finding an individual receives Fourth Amendment protection of remotely stored AOL 
emails), with Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (applying Fourth Amendment protections to email 
correspondence despite the reduced standard of proof in the SCA); see also Green, supra note 
45, at 190 (advancing cloud technology as an example of a confusing concept to regulate with 
current legislation). 
131 See Hinz, supra note 47, at 515 (illustrating how the framework of the SCA fails to 
consider online activity that fits both ECS and RCS categories). 
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government may obtain “contents of a wire or electronic communication,” 
which applies to virtually all of the services offered online.132  
Nevertheless, because the SCA contains limited definitions of different 
kinds of ISPs, many services today do not easily fit within the ECS or RCS 
classification.133  This framework shifts the burden onto courts to 
determine what privacy considerations a unique Internet service 
deserves.134  The credibility of the process by which courts determine the 
proper standard of proof erodes if the governing statute lacks sufficient 
definitions of the services affected.135  Microsoft was an example of this 
attrition.136 
Ultimately, Microsoft laid to rest much of the confusion observed when 
the term “warrant” found in § 2703(a) is conflated with a court order or 
subpoena available in § 2703(d), specifically regarding their geographic 
limitations.137  However, this decision only addressed the privacy 
protection afforded to one common form of electronic activity and heaved 
a glut of other common forms into the shadows.138  As a result, the 
geographic reach of court orders authorized by § 2703(d) remains 
unfettered.139 
                                                
132 See § 2703(a) (defining the broad scope of the government’s authority). 
133 See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (expressing 
concern over the difficulty in applying the SCA to the various forms of communications 
technologies). 
134 See id. (identifying that CSLI falls within § 2703(d) and that the reduced standard of 
proof is not per se unconstitutional).  However, the court heavily analyzed what standard of 
proof should be applied pursuant to the SCA.  Id. at 610.  See also In re U.S. for Orders 
Authorizing Installation and Use, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (D. Md. 2006) (noting the statute’s 
lack of clear definitions regarding the disclosure of CSLI). 
135 See Baker, supra note 47, at 110 (stating courts have difficulty in applying the SCA, which 
led to a quizzical body of jurisprudence). 
136 See supra Part II.C (analyzing the rationale and privacy implications of Microsoft in the 
Southern District Court of New York).  In effect, Microsoft removed the probable cause 
requirement set forth in Warshak.  Supra Part II.C. 
137 See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (determining that 
Congress unequivocally intended for geographic limitations enumerated in F.R.C.P. 41 to 
apply to SCA warrants); Green, supra note 45, at 192 (predicting all ECPA warrants in the 
future may functionally resemble subpoenas). 
138 See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 220–22 (analyzing the issue of geographic limitations 
only within the context of § 2703(a) warrants). 
139 See id. at 216 (reinforcing the concept that subpoenas may be applied extraterritorially 
by stating foreign entities are not absolutely insulated from U.S. grand jury subpoenas solely 
because of their geographic location). 
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B. The Microsoft Reversal Only Partially Addresses Data Privacy 
Two issues loom in the aftermath of Microsoft.140  First, the SCA does 
not require probable cause to compel an ISP to disclose email content data 
that is in RCS storage for more than 180 days.141  Second, though the 
Second Circuit applied the geographic bounds found in the F.R.C.P. to 
§ 2703(a), the court failed to address whether these same limits apply to 
other court orders authorized in § 2703(d).142  Assuming the same facts in 
Microsoft except replacing the email content data the government sought 
with non-content data, similar international considerations would be 
triggered if a U.S. agency infringed on the sovereign authority of another 
nation by obtaining that data.143 
In Microsoft, the lower court relied heavily on the language of 
§ 2703(d) where a SCA warrant functions more like a subpoena, rather 
than a search warrant, and required a lower standard of proof.144  Neither 
Warshak nor Microsoft directly addressed the sufficiency of the 180-day 
limitation as a determinative factor when conducting Fourth Amendment 
analyses.145  Further, scholars suggest the 180-day distinction no longer 
advances the original purport of the SCA.146 
Broad application of the third-party doctrine to vastly distinct forms 
of personal data threatens the Fourth Amendment rights of United States 
                                                
140 See infra Part III.B (summarizing the standard of proof and extraterritoriality issues 
following Microsoft). 
141 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (authorizing compelled disclosure “of the contents of a 
wire or electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic 
communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days” using a court order in 
§ 2703(d)); § 2703(d) (“[a] court order . . . may be issued by any court that is a court of 
competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and 
articulable facts showing that . . . the contents . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”). 
142 See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 208 (applying the F.R.C.P. only to SCA § 2703(a)). 
143 See id. at 221 (deliberating upon previously established law enforcement procedures 
between the United States and Ireland by way of the MLAT). 
144 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 468–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (discussing 
various standards of proof available under § 2703); Hinz, supra note 47, at 521 (summarizing 
a recent suggestion by Senator Patrick Leahy to eliminate the 180-day distinction within the 
SCA and require a warrant for all data). 
145 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that 
email correspondence today may contain information concerning an individual’s private 
life); In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 477 (rejecting Fourth Amendment protections 
for email communications on the basis of the third-party doctrine). 
146 See Backer, supra note 18, at 399 (arguing the SCA is outdated and the privacy 
considerations of numerous Americans are at risk); Daskal, supra note 9, at 378–79 
(concluding geographic location no longer limits investigations involving data); Hinz supra 
note 47, at 518 (summarizing unsuccessful proposed legislation to remove the 180-day time 
limitation found within the SCA). 
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citizens.147  In Katz, the Court stated that communications conducted in 
public do not automatically lose Fourth Amendment protections.148  Email 
correspondence today regularly occurs both publicly and privately, and 
users still consider data relating to their messages private.149  Yet, without 
further statutory protection in the SCA, individuals will continue to 
submit private information to third-party services like Twitter under the 
misconception that their data is somehow protected.150  Though the 
Second Circuit availed priority stored communications data sought by 
SCA warrants with Fourth Amendment considerations, non-priority 
stored communications sought with SCA court orders and subpoenas 
remains unprotected.151 
Email data today is sharply distinguishable from both the banking 
records that spawned the third-party doctrine and email data common in 
1986 when Congress enacted the SCA.152  Banking records reveal strictly 
                                                
147 See Cover, supra note 48, at 1473 (positing many corporations act as avatars for their 
users and individuals have a privacy expectation despite the existence of the third-party 
doctrine). 
148 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (providing 
that individuals may express a subjective desire to keep certain communications or materials 
private, even while in public areas); see also Baker, supra note 47, at 459 (applying the concept 
of the term public to easily accessible social media accounts like Twitter or Facebook); but see 
In re Search Warrant No. 16–960–M–01 to Google, No. 16-960-M, 2017 WL 471564, at *11 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 3, 2017) (holding that processing SCA warrants to obtain potentially foreign-stored 
data controlled by Google does not involve extraterritorial government conduct).  The Court 
emphasized “[e]lectronically transferring data from a server in a foreign country to Google’s 
data center in California does not amount to a ‘seizure’ because there is no meaningful 
interference with the account holder’s possessory interest in the user data.”  In re Search 
Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 2017 WL 471564, at *9.  See also Elsevier, Inc. v. Grossman, 
No. 12 CIV 5121 (KPF), 2016 WL 7077109, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016) (analyzing the possible 
extraterritorial implications of a RICO investigation after Microsoft). 
149 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (finding that data poses no immediate 
threat to an arresting officer, and thus, its seizure must only be accessed pursuant to a search 
warrant); Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1585–86 (analyzing an individual’s subjective 
expectation of privacy with respect to the Fourth Amendment). 
150 See Cover, supra note 48, at 1450 (positing the voluntary nature of Internet 
communications threaten to diminish privacy expectations pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment); see also Froomkin, @Snowden, supra note 98 (predicting Twitter will face 
pressure from the U.S. government to disclose data concerning tweets made by Edward 
Snowden from @Snowden). 
151 See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 214 (2d Cir. 2016) (“When the government 
compels a private party to assist it in conducting a search or seizure, the private party 
becomes an agent of the government, and the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause applies 
in full force to the private party’s actions.”).  Here, the court discussed only warrants and not 
subpoenas or court orders.  Id. 
152 See Hinz supra note 47, at 492–93 (noting hospitals faced high costs to store medical 
records and some chose to send records electronically to third-party storage services); 
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financial information, while email content today may contain anything 
from an Amazon receipt to sensitive health information.153  In the past, 
businesses primarily used email for internal communication on private 
servers, distinct from other email servers used by other businesses.154  
Today, businesses, organizations, and individuals alike all utilize publicly 
available email and other services for convenient communication on a 
daily basis.155  A conglomeration of all of the data an individual transmits 
renders a unique account of his or her life.156  Courts reviewing the SCA 
have yet to fully recognize this distinction.157 
SCA orders and subpoenas, available under the significantly reduced 
specific and articulable facts standard, establish an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment.158  Courts recognize this exception without considering the 
concept of intrusion discussed in Katz.159  By requiring the ISP to surrender 
information related to an ongoing criminal investigation, the government 
                                                
Kastenmeier, supra note 54, at 734 (stating cell phone tracking is more difficult than that of 
traditional mobile phones). 
153 See Cover, supra note 48, at 1449 (describing the ways technology companies today 
gather and utilize user data).  Amazon recommends books based on an individual’s 
shopping history.  Id.  Readers of the online Washington Post receive ads tailored from their 
Amazon history as well.  Id.  Online shopping history can reveal intimate personal 
information, for example that an individual is pregnant.  Id.  See also Langley, supra note 9, at 
1642 (advancing that Fitbits monitor, among other things, respiration, heart rate, and 
hydration level).  These devices transmit information everywhere they go but surprisingly 
are not regulated by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) or 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).  Id. at 1648. 
154 See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1559–60 (describing the limited nature of early business 
Internet usage). 
155 See Robison, supra note 53, at 1202 (examining cloud technology and its role in reducing 
a user’s physical location as a barrier to accessing and manipulating data). 
156 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) (musing that the term 
“account” truly conveys the illustrative nature of the sum of a user’s data). 
157 See Greenwald, supra note 98 (summarizing widespread domestic and international 
concern following the disclosure of NSA collection of mass cell phone records by Edward 
Snowden); cf. Cook, supra note 98 (rebuking the government’s request for Apple to create 
code capable of bypassing older iPhone encryption technology on the grounds that this 
would lead to future requests for code capable of bypassing new iPhone technology, thus 
compromising the privacy considerations of millions of individuals worldwide).  Privacy 
legislation, such as the SCA, may become totally obsolete if the government may access 
content on mobile devices without the aid of the manufacturer.  Cook, supra note 98. 
158 See Shickich, supra note 48, at 463–64 (explaining SCA orders do not require probable 
cause but allow the government to compel disclosure of non-content data by ISPs). 
159 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“There is a 
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”); In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (allowing 
compelled disclosure of email non-content data based on a showing of specific and 
articulable facts rather than probable cause). 
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avoids having to conduct an intrusive search.160  Instead, the ISP obtains 
the data and delivers it to the government.161  However, an intrusion still 
occurs regardless of who obtains the data.162  The hybrid function of the 
§ 2703(d) court order is to blame for this form of intrusion, and the 
evidence obtained on this basis threatens basic constitutional rights of 
millions of Internet users.163 
Widespread use of the SCA to obtain stored communications data 
without corresponding Fourth Amendment scruples enables the 
government to obtain a detailed portrait of an individual’s private life.164  
When aggregated, electronic communications data form a mosaic of an 
individual’s life and allows the government to look in with much more 
detail than an ordinary wiretap or pen-register.165  The government is able 
to take this data, and through computing technology, paint very accurate 
portraits of individuals under investigation.166  Allowing this type of 
information gathering on such a low standard of proof threatens the 
Fourth Amendment protections of liberty itself.167  Congress must 
recognize this chasm, act swiftly to correct the outdated SCA, and 
                                                
160 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 471–72 (accepting the government’s 
contention that the SCA warrant functions more like a subpoena and does not involve a 
search). 
161 See Klamann, supra note 69, at 1421 (stating the task of obtaining the data is assigned to 
the ISP, not the government). 
162 See Search, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 672 (defining a search as:  “[a]n 
examination of a person’s body, property, or other area that the person would reasonably be 
expected to consider as private, conducted by a law enforcement officer for the purpose of 
finding evidence of a crime”); Seizure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 678 
(elucidating seizure as:  “[t]he act or instance of taking possession of a person or property by 
legal right or process; esp. . . . a confiscation or arrest that may interfere with a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy”); Morrison, supra note 9, at 267 (offering that the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) may ask ISPs to search for illegal content on websites). 
163 See Backer, supra note 18, at 398 (underlining the need for updated legislation to avoid 
privacy violations when the government obtains mass amounts of communications data 
linked to an individual without a warrant); Foley, supra note 33, 468 (addressing the issue of 
whether or not casual online searches should be afforded constitutional privacy protections 
based on originalist interpretation). 
164 See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1596 (finding the SCA poses constitutional questions to 
data in remote storage); see also Atkins, supra note 99, at 75 (summarizing recent privacy 
concerns following reporting that the United States conducts broad dragnet-style 
surveillance over its citizens without their knowledge under the PATRIOT Act). 
165 See Walsh, Mosaic, supra note 47, at 223 (positing that because an individual’s 
movements can be tracked with current technology, there should be some limit to the 
government’s ability to do so). 
166 See id. at 173 (summarizing recognition of mosaic theory by the Supreme Court). 
167 See id. at 239 (explaining non-content data such as CSLI and email account log 
information can be used to track an individual’s physical movements). 
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rebalance the liberty interests of individuals with the needs of law 
enforcement.168 
In general, courts may not construe extraterritorial application within 
an act absent express language or clear legislative intent thereof.169  
However, the lower court in Microsoft interpreted one passage of 
legislative history expressly prohibiting extraterritorial application as an 
express endorsement.170  The House Report reflects the SCA applies only 
to data transactions taking place within the territorial United States.171  
Further, when Congress enacted the SCA, extraterritorial searches would 
have been inconceivable because most email activity at the time occurred 
domestically within private servers, primarily for business purposes.172  
Thus, the rationale utilized by the Southern District of New York in 
applying SCA warrants extraterritorially lacked congressional approval 
and violated the presumption against territoriality.173 
The legislative history surrounding the 1986 Act indicates Congress 
did not intend for any provision involving compelled disclosure in the 
                                                
168 See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 233 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring) 
(commending Congress on previously adept privacy legislation and urging legislators to 
“take the occasion to address thoughtfully and dispassionately the suitability of many of the 
statute’s provisions to serving contemporary needs[]” and amend the SCA); see also Marca, 
supra note 91, at 995 (positing the location of the data as a key point in the government 
disclosure analysis); Battey Jr., supra note 91, at 292–93 (suggesting Congress look to the 
already relevant LEADS Act for guidance in adding a warrant requirement to the outdated 
SCA). 
169 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 249 (2010) (prohibiting 
extraterritorial application of statutes lacking either express language or Congressional 
assent thereof); but see Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 443 (1932) (holding the 
government may, in relation to a criminal trial, compel the return of a U.S. citizen that 
maintained minimum contacts with the United States); see also Schultheis, supra note 9, at 675 
(stating the text of the SCA does not reference extraterritorial application). 
170 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (upholding the SCA 
warrant to compel Microsoft to produce data located in Ireland); Morrison, 561 U.S. at 249 
(mandating when neither a federal statute nor its legislative history indicates intent for 
extraterritorial application, it has none). 
171 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 473 (acknowledging the House Report while 
accepting the government’s position that in the instant case, the function of the SCA warrant 
does not involve extraterritorial principles); H.R. Rep. 99-647, at 32–33 (1986) (indicating “the 
controls in [§ 2703] regarding access to stored wire and electronic communications are 
intended to apply only to access within the territorial United States”) (emphasis added). 
172 See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1563 (stating in the 1980s, even if businesses stored 
communications remotely, those servers were domestic). 
173 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 477 (allowing the DOJ to compel Microsoft 
to return data stored in Ireland); Schultheis, supra note 9, at 680 (summarizing Ireland’s 
concern over the United States unilaterally seizing emails stored within its borders); but see 
Kerr, Third-Party, supra note 34, at 566 (defending application of the third-party doctrine in 
that it focuses on data neutrality rather than the individual’s origin in a more orderly 
fashion). 
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SCA to apply extraterritorially.174  However, the lower court in Microsoft 
ignored the House Report in favor of case law supporting the position that 
since it is the ISP that obtains the data, no principles of extraterritoriality 
are affected.175  There, Microsoft acknowledged the presumption against 
extraterritoriality found in Morrison, yet chose to distinguish that case 
from the current situation based on the hybrid function of the SCA 
warrant.176  In fact, the magistrate judge conceded that the language of 
§ 2703(a) ambiguously references the requirements of the F.R.C.P. without 
addressing the issue of extraterritoriality.177  Distinguishable from 
Blackmer, the warrant in Microsoft was aimed at a third-party ISP, not an 
individual.178  Many larger ISPs operate globally and maintain some form 
of minimum contacts with the United States.179  Because many of these 
ISPs retain non-content data domestically, the government could easily 
obtain non-priority stored communications by securing the § 2703(d) 
order in the district within which the company stores the data.180  
Currently, § 2703(d) orders do not require probable cause and can be used 
to obtain a wide variety of non-priority data.181  Then, the government can 
analyze that data and utilize it to particularize future orders, subpoenas, 
or warrants.182  Thus, § 2703(d) remains a trap door for government 
                                                
174 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 478 (holding the SCA may be applied to 
obtain data stored outside U.S. borders); see also H.R. Rep. 99-647, at 32–33 (1986) 
(determining the term “interstate or foreign commerce” excludes interceptions that occur 
outside of the United States). 
175 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 479 (concluding the government’s reach 
established in Blackmer was sufficient to override the House Report’s express prohibition on 
extraterritorial application). 
176 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (authorizing compelled disclosure of stored 
communications data); In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 471–72 (dismissing the issue 
of extraterritorial application in favor of the framework of the SCA). 
177 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 470 (admitting that the language of the 
statute is ambiguous regarding the physical limitations of the F.R.C.P.).  The F.R.C.P., if 
applicable to § 2703(d), require subpoenas and court orders to be executed domestically.  Id. 
178 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 433 (1932) (stating Blackmer chose to travel 
to France and remained there even after being served a subpoena under a long-arm statute); 
In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (noting Microsoft is a third-party ISP subject to 
required disclosure in § 2703). 
179 See Cover, supra note 48, at 1478 (highlighting the global nature of U.S.-based companies 
like Apple and Google); Markoff, supra note 97 (advancing Microsoft is testing innovative 
underwater storage centers outside U.S. jurisdiction).  Microsoft’s reported aim is to explore 
and implement environmentally friendly storage methods.  Markoff, supra note 97. 
180 See Cover, supra note 48, at 1460 (describing how non-content data may be disclosed 
without a warrant); Shickich, supra note 48, at 469 (finding that non-content data enjoys little 
Fourth Amendment protection under the SCA). 
181 See Shickich, supra note 48, at 462–63 (enumerating customer name, address, records of 
session durations, and length and type of service used as examples of non-content data). 
182 See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 1583 (stating that personal data reveals much more about 
an individual than ordinary business records such as physical location). 
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investigations.183  Likely a result, courts in the future will have little 
guidance as to the privacy expectations and procedures of non-priority 
stored communications.184 
Individuals and ISPs alike have an interest in a definitive statutory 
resolution regarding privacy expectations of non-priority data and 
extraterritorial application of the SCA.185  With the privacy protections of 
§ 2703(d) left unresolved, domestic and foreign entities that do business 
with United States citizens are still subject to similar orders in 
surrendering evidence in the company’s custody, possession, or control.186  
By compelling corporations to procure the materials themselves, courts 
may avoid extraterritoriality concerns, but they do not avoid possible 
international implications.187  The same standard to obtain bank records 
now seemingly applies to non-priority data in the wake of Microsoft.188  As 
a result, domestic ISPs stand to lose substantial future business due to 
privacy concerns of their customers.189  Additionally, by seizing non-
priority stored communications located abroad through SCA warrants, 
the United States government stands to lose credibility within the 
international community.190  Discord between existing doctrines and the 
Microsoft decision leaves future courts at peril in granting SCA warrants 
seeking data stored outside of the United States, and some states are 
                                                
183 See Shickich, supra note 48, at 462–63 (conveying that non-content records may be 
disclosed under the reduced standard of proof found in § 2703(d)). 
184 See id. at 464 (establishing the general trend that courts view non-content data as less 
deserving of privacy protection than content data). 
185 See Baker, supra note 47, at 110–11 (arguing for the heavy reform or outright repeal of 
the SCA due to evidence of inadequacy in application across a wide range of courts); 
Mitsilegas, supra note 97, at 44 (outlining one response taken by Microsoft to keep Europeans’ 
data safe from U.S.-based intelligence efforts). 
186 See Green, supra note 45, at 199 (stating Apple, Google, and Facebook have begun 
encrypting their users’ data); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 249 (2010) 
(endorsing the presumption against extraterritoriality when a statute contains only domestic 
considerations). 
187 See Green, supra note 45, at 199 (suggesting that a notice requirement may prove helpful 
in resolving international complications); Schultheis, supra note 9, at 682 (stating nations are 
to work together in investigating and prosecuting crime); see also Walsh, Extraterritoriality, 
supra note 40, at 640 (arguing that the government has an interest in pursuing SEC violations 
abroad but must also follow the Constitution and the presumption against extraterritoriality 
in its pursuits). 
188 See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2016) (analyzing 
extraterritorial application of the SCA only within the context of § 2703(a)). 
189 See Swanson, supra note 97, at 712 (noting Google filed for a patent for a water-based 
data center in 2007); but see Schultheis, supra note 9, at 669 (stating the lower court in Microsoft 
ignored geographic boundaries altogether by focusing on the function of the SCA warrant). 
190 See Schultheis, supra note 9, at 683 (discussing possible negative international responses 
to the use of SCA warrants like in Microsoft). 
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experimenting with their own privacy legislation to avoid state-level 
instances of the federal Microsoft scenario.191 
C. CalECPA Resolves Microsoft’s Deficiencies 
Congress met growing concern for government accountability and 
individual privacy following the Snowden leaks with little legislative 
action.192  Further uncertainty involving the standard of proof and 
extraterritoriality limitations that normally accompany search warrants 
could compound international tensions.193  This Part discusses the 
CalECPA with regard to its potential to solve the questionable standard 
of proof and extraterritorial application of the SCA evident in Microsoft.194 
While other states approached the issue of digital privacy with a 
probable cause requirement, the CalECPA is the most comprehensive bill 
of its kind.195  By eliminating the 180-day distinction found in the SCA, the 
CalECPA requires each warrant to be granted upon a showing of probable 
cause.196  This heightened standard of proof may resolve the 
                                                
191 See infra Part III.C (examining the strengths and weaknesses of the CalECPA compared 
to the SCA); Berman, supra note 44, at 321 (describing numerous concerns following the 
Southern District of New York’s ratification of the warrant in Microsoft). 
192 See Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 1233–34 (analyzing rationales for raising the 
standard of proof required to obtain user data).  Kerr suggests raising privacy protections 
for content stored for more than 180 days.  Id. at 1234.  See also Froomkin, @Snowden, supra 
note 99 (describing the amendment to the PATRIOT Act as a minimal win for privacy 
advocates). 
193 See Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 221 (acknowledging delicate international considerations 
in denying extraterritorial application of the warrant authorized by § 2703(a)); Daskal, supra 
note 9, at 378 (arguing SCA warrants should be subject to the same territorial limitations as 
ordinary search warrants governed by the F.R.C.P.). 
194 See infra Part III.C (analyzing the potential of the CalECPA to resolve lingering privacy 
concerns following Microsoft). 
195 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 168/10 (2016) (requiring a court order based on probable cause 
to obtain CSLI); IND. CODE § 35-33-5-9 (2016) (prohibiting disclosure of data and use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance without proving probable cause); MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE § 10-408 (2015) (requiring a court order based on probable cause for law 
enforcement to obtain location information based on cell phones or other devices on an 
individual during a criminal investigation); MINN. STAT. § 626A.42 (2016) (prohibiting the 
use of cell phone location information in a criminal investigation without a warrant based 
on probable cause); MONT. CODE § 46-5-110 (2015) (mandating a government entity must 
obtain a search warrant before obtaining location information of an electronic device); TENN. 
CODE § 39-13-610 (2016) (forbidding a governmental entity or law enforcement agency from 
obtaining the location information of an electronic device without a search warrant). 
196 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure 
by a provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one 
hundred and eighty days or less . . . .”), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (2016) (“A court 
shall issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the 
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inconsistencies seen in previous cases analyzing the SCA.197  Further, 
Warshak established Fourth Amendment protections for email 
communications.198  While Warshak is controlling law only within the Sixth 
Circuit, the CalECPA bolsters privacy expectations of email 
communications by requiring probable cause for all warrants seeking 
disclosure of electronic communications information from an ISP on a 
state level.199  The required standard of proof became an issue in Microsoft 
because there, extraterritorial application of the warrant only involved 
email data in storage for less than 180 days.200  The CalECPA contains no 
such time distinction and probable cause is required for the government 
to obtain electronic communications data.201  With exact language, the 
CalECPA addresses the probable cause and extraterritorial application 
issues seen in Microsoft.202 
CalECPA section 1546.1(d)(3) prohibits extraterritorial application of 
government surveillance powers by requiring warrants issued under the 
CalECPA to comply with the general constraints of search warrants.203  
                                                
information is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by 
state or federal law.”). 
197 See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that 
granting an SCA warrant to obtain CSLI based on the specific and articulable facts standard 
is not per se unconstitutional under the third-party doctrine); In re Application of U.S., 733 
F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (mandating probable cause for a warrant to obtain CSLI). 
198 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding the Fourth 
Amendment applies to email correspondence); Bowman, supra note 52, at 828 (describing 
Warshak as an expansion of the Fourth Amendment for email communications). 
199 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(1) (“The warrant shall describe with particularity the 
information to be seized by specifying the time periods covered and, as appropriate and 
reasonable, the target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and the 
types of information sought.”); § 1546.1(d)(2) (“A court shall issue such an order upon a 
finding that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active 
investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.”); see also 
Backer, supra note 18, at 396 (suggesting email communications are private and therefore 
must be protected by a probable cause requirement consistent with the Fourth Amendment); 
Shepard, supra note 100, at 424 (identifying inadequacies between the federal and state 
constitutions). 
200 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (applying the 180-
day distinction seen in the SCA to the email data requested by the government). 
201 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (“A court shall issue such an order upon a finding 
that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active 
investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.”). 
202 See § 1546.1(d)(3) (“The warrant shall comply with all other provisions of California and 
federal law, including any provisions prohibiting, limiting, or imposing additional 
requirements on the use of search warrants.”). 
203 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the 
disclosure . . . only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(3) (“The warrant 
shall comply with all other provisions of California and federal law, including any provisions 
prohibiting, limiting, or imposing additional requirements on the use of search warrants.”); 
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CalECPA Section 1546.1(a)(1) establishes a presumption against 
compelled disclosure of electronic communications information, but 
allows the government to compel an ISP to turn over data under limited 
circumstances.204  The exceptions provided under Section 1546.1(c) limit 
the government’s ability to access the data itself or compel the ISP to 
surrender it instead.205  However, similar to the SCA, the CalECPA does 
not contemplate the geographic reach of its subpoenas capable of 
accessing non-content data, such as sender and recipient information and 
time logs.206  Courts outside of the Second Circuit may, like the lower court 
in Microsoft, find no extraterritorial concerns, and continue to grant SCA 
warrants, subpoenas, and court orders seeking content and non-content 
data stored abroad.207  Conversely, if courts interpret Microsoft and the 
                                                
see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“A magistrate judge with authority in the district . . . has 
authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the 
district.”). 
204 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the 
disclosure . . . only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1) (“Except as 
provided in this section, a government entity shall not do any of the following:  [c]ompel the 
production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.”).  
Compelled disclosure under § 2703(a) does not require an ongoing criminal investigation, 
while the CalECPA does.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1).  But see 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued . . . if 
the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication . . . are 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”). 
205 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(c)(6) (“If the government entity, in good faith, believes 
that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person 
requires access to the electronic device information.”); § 1546.1(c)(7) (“If the government 
entity, in good faith, believes the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the 
entity shall only access electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify, 
or contact the owner or authorized possessor of the device.”); see also Magid, supra note 19 
(reporting the CalECPA restricts the government’s ability to compel disclosure of user data 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment by requiring probable cause). 
206 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(b)(4) (providing the government may compel production 
of or access to electronic information from an ISP “[p]ursuant to a subpoena issued pursuant 
to existing state law, provided that the information is not sought for the purpose of 
investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense, and compelling the production of or access 
to the information via the subpoena is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law”); see 
also Shickich, supra note 48, at 461–62 (reviewing the non-content data such as search terms, 
cookies, and IP addresses in Twitter’s record retention consent clickwrap form). 
207 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a 
provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, that has been in electronic storage . . . .”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1) 
(“Except as provided in this section, a government entity shall not do any of the following:  
[c]ompel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service 
provider.”); but see In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (likening 
SCA warrants to subpoenas in that government agents do not physically travel to where the 
data is stored). 
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provisions of the CalECPA to prohibit extraterritorial application, 
government requests for data would be subject to the geographic 
limitations found within F.R.C.P. 41.208 
Warshak, Microsoft, and the newly enacted CalECPA all show promise 
to reinforce the privacy interests of U.S. citizens.209  Absent a showing of 
probable cause, CalECPA generally prohibits required disclosure of 
relevant materials to the government during an investigation.210  Further, 
the government would only be able to require disclosure by the ISP under 
limited circumstances and not just because a certain email account is 
under investigation.211  Finally, ISPs are not prohibited from providing 
notice to the individual linked to the email account, except in certain 
circumstances.212  Because the CalECPA offers improvements that resolve 
both issues seen in Microsoft, Congress should revise the SCA with similar 
language in mind.213 
                                                
208 Compare In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (finding the execution of the SCA 
warrant does not extend the government’s reach beyond United States’s borders), with 
Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 214 (2d Cir. 2016) (“When the government 
compels a private party to assist it in conducting a search or seizure, the private party 
becomes an agent of the government, and the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause applies 
in full force to the private party’s actions.”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“A magistrate 
judge with authority in the district . . . has authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize 
a person or property located within the district.”). 
209 See Backer, supra note 18, at 397 (urging the Supreme Court to resolve the dispute 
following Microsoft); Shickich, supra note 48 at 469 (stating courts treat non-content data as 
existing within public space). 
210 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (“A court shall issue such an order upon a finding 
that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active 
investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.”); see also 
Green, supra note 45, at 392–93 (offering the government may employ SCA warrants with 
corresponding gag orders forbidding the ISP from providing notice of the search to the 
individual associated with the stored data). 
211 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) 
may be issued . . . if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”), with 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1) (“Except as provided in this section, a government entity 
shall not do any of the following:  [c]ompel the production of or access to electronic 
communication information from a service provider.”). 
212 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.2(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, any 
government entity that executes a warrant[] . . . shall serve upon[] . . . the identified targets 
of the warrant or emergency access, a notice that informs the recipient that information about 
the recipient has been compelled or obtained . . . .”). 
213 See infra Part III.D (proposing amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)). 
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D. A Proposed Solution to the Extraterritorial SCA Warrant 
Establishing a general probable cause standard to compel disclosure 
of content and non-content data would ensure that Americans freely 
communicate with one another without fear of unwarranted government 
surveillance.214  Because the CalECPA does not expressly address 
extraterritorial seizure of stored communications data, language from the 
F.R.C.P. would suffice in supplementing the outdated SCA.215  Including 
these provisions would cure the extraterritoriality and standard of proof 
woes seen in Microsoft, and thus, Congress should amend § 2703(d) to 
mirror the more robust provisions of the CalECPA.216 
1. Amendment to SCA § 2703(d) 
Scholars reviewing required disclosure of content and non-content 
under the SCA recommend raising the minimum standard of proof to 
probable cause.217  Further, scholars disagree with the extraterritorial 
application of a seemingly domestic statute.218  A controlling statute with 
a stricter standard of proof may have changed the course earlier on in 
Microsoft.219 
The proposed text would appear as follows: 
                                                
214 See Backer, supra note 18, at 397 (describing limited privacy protections available to 
email correspondence under the SCA); Langley, supra note 9, at 1658 (recommending that 
personal health data be incorporated into the definition of contents within the SCA due to 
the sensitive nature of personal health information). 
215 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(3) (“The warrant shall comply with all other 
provisions of California and federal law, including any provisions prohibiting, limiting, or 
imposing additional requirements on the use of search warrants.”), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 
41(b)(1) (“A magistrate judge with authority in the district . . . has authority to issue a 
warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the district.”); see also 
Shickich, supra note 48, at 464 (describing circumstances under which Twitter user’s non-
content data may be disclosed to law enforcement without a warrant). 
216 See infra Part III.D (proposing an amendment to § 2703(d) of the SCA). 
217 See Backer, supra note 18, at 397 (predicting the Supreme Court will take the SCA 
standard of proof issue on directly); Schultheis, supra note 9, at 1453 (calling for a probable 
cause requirement to compel disclosure of personal data from an ISP under the SCA 
following the controversial leaks made by Edward Snowden). 
218 See Backer, supra note 18, at 397 (suggesting that email users enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy); Schultheis, supra note 9, at 682 (claiming extraterritorial processing 
of SCA warrants threatens the cloud computing industry on a global scale). 
219 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding the structure 
of the SCA sufficient to justify extraterritorial application); Matter of Warrant to Search a 
Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 
F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that the SCA does not obligate Microsoft to disclose 
email content data located in Ireland). 
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d) Requirements for court order.  A court order for 
disclosure pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures 
described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the 
case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures), 
under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court 
that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue 
only if the governmental entity offers specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, or the records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation upon a finding that there is probable cause to 
believe that the information is relevant to an active 
investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state 
or federal law . . . In the case of a State governmental 
authority, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited 
by the law of such State.  A court issuing an order 
pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by 
the service provider, may quash or modify such order, if 
the information or records requested are unusually 
voluminous in nature or compliance with such order 
otherwise would cause an undue burden on such 
provider.220 
2. Commentary 
The proposed amendment to the SCA recalibrates the relationship 
between the government’s interest in prosecuting crime and the Fourth 
Amendment privacy expectations of individuals.221  Requiring a showing 
of probable cause eliminates the ambiguous authority presented between 
                                                
220 The proposed amendment above is the work of the author.  The author wishes to add 
text shown in italics, and remove existing text shown with strikethrough.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(a) (describing the technical limitations of SCA warrants); § 2703(d) (allowing required 
disclosure based on specific and articulable facts); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (“A court 
shall issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the 
information is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by 
state or federal law.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“A magistrate judge with authority in the 
district . . . has authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located 
within the district.”) (emphasis added); Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10 (suggesting Congress 
amend the SCA); Woods, supra note 87, at 781 (arguing that Congress must adjust the 
jurisdictional reach of the ECPA and accommodate criminal or counterterrorism 
investigations for foreign governments). 
221 See supra Part III.B (analyzing apparent weaknesses within the SCA regarding the 
standard of proof and extraterritorial application). 
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the SCA and the F.R.C.P. in Microsoft.222  The proposed amendment also 
includes language from the F.R.C.P. limiting the geographic reach court 
orders and subpoenas issued under § 2703(d) while providing the 
possibility for emergency exceptions.223  A requirement that the data in 
question be stored within the issuing district along with an increased 
burden of proof ensures the government may not exceed its constitutional 
reach.224  These measures will have limited effects, however, because the 
SCA is not the only federal statute currently authorizing government 
surveillance of electronic communications with a standard of proof lower 
than probable cause.225  Further, the CalECPA does not allow the 
government to obtain information for criminal investigations using 
hybrid search warrants.226  Because the CalECPA is currently untested in 
the courts, it remains unclear whether its provisions will solve the issues 
evident in Microsoft.227  State solutions such as the CalECPA would limit 
state power, but not federal power due to the lingering SCA.228 
The CalECPA, subject to limited exceptions, requires the government 
to show probable cause in exchange for any warrant seeking to access 
                                                
222 See supra Part III.C (discussing ambiguity within 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) as to whether the 
geographic limitations of the F.R.C.P. apply to § 2703(a) and arguing a clearer definition 
would aid courts in reviewing SCA cases). 
223 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“A magistrate judge with authority in the district . . . has 
authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the 
district.”).  F.R.C.P. 41 also includes exceptions to its territorial limit.  Id.  For example, facing 
threat of imminent bodily harm to an individual, the law enforcement may exceed its 
territorial authority.  Id.  See also Walsh, Extraterritoriality, supra note 40, at 642–43 (providing 
specific national security exceptions allowing courts to violate the presumption against 
extraterritoriality). 
224 See Backer, supra note 18, at 399 (arguing the SCA must be revisited by Congress due to 
the problematic application of its provisions as seen in Microsoft). 
225 See USA PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B) (2012) (stating to obtain a warrant to 
seize foreign tangible things the government must produce “a statement of facts showing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to 
an authorized investigation”); Atkins, supra note 99, at 81 (arguing that the standard of proof 
found in the PATRIOT Act must be raised to probable cause); Froomkin, @Snowden, supra 
note 98 (lamenting that Congress made little substantive change to the majority of the 
controversial and intrusive nature of the PATRIOT Act). 
226 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (2016) (“A court shall issue such an order upon a 
finding that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active 
investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.”). 
227 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (applying little 
available case law relevant to extraterritorial application of the SCA). 
228 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (“A court shall issue such an order upon a finding 
that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active 
investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law . . . .”) (emphasis 
added); Zetter, supra note 101 (providing that five states have similar protections for data 
content and nine have warrant protections for GPS data); Kelly, supra note 113, at 697 
(musing the potential benefit of modeling an amendment to the SCA after the CalECPA). 
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electronic information, including stored information.229  Regarding notice, 
CalECPA warrants require notice to the individual as a default, subject to 
certain exceptions.230  Current disagreement among courts in granting 
SCA warrants for various types of information often boils down to which 
authority the judge prefers.231  Further, Microsoft only expressly resolved 
the issue of extraterritorial application as to SCA warrants, and not court 
orders or subpoenas.232  If future trial courts grant SCA warrants for email 
data without the government showing probable cause, the burden then 
shifts on the appellate court to invalidate that warrant.233  Of the proposed 
textual amendments to the SCA, there is little scholarly analysis of the 
appropriate standard of proof for non-content data.234  Adding twenty-
first century language to the SCA will more concretely alert courts as to 
the reach of their court orders and subpoenas.235 
Scholars propose alternatives relying on today’s often-catastrophic 
legislative process to amend the federal SCA as displayed in F.R.C.P. 
41(b)(6).236  While the government has a definite interest in gaining tools 
to combat tech-savvy criminals, the language of F.R.C.P. 41(b)(6) is both 
                                                
229 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1) (“Except as provided in this section, a government 
entity shall not do any of the following:  [c]ompel the production of or access to electronic 
communication information from a service provider.”). 
230 See § 1546.2(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, any government entity 
that executes a warrant[] . . . shall serve upon[] . . . the identified targets of the warrant or 
emergency access, a notice that informs the recipient that information about the recipient has 
been compelled or obtained . . . .”). 
231 See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (granting an 
SCA warrant to collect cell site information based on the specific and articulable facts 
threshold is not per se unconstitutional under the third-party doctrine); In re Application of 
U.S., 733 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (mandating a showing of probable cause for a 
warrant to obtain CSLI); In re U.S. for Orders Authorizing Installation and Use, 416 F. Supp. 
2d 390, 397 (D. Md. 2006) (holding probable cause was required for CSLI data). 
232 See Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained 
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 221 (2d Cir. 2016) (recalibrating the issue 
of geographic limitations within the context of § 2703(a)). 
233 See id. at 222 (reversing the lower court decision to uphold the SCA warrant). 
234 See Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 1235–36 (proposing amended text to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d) to resolve confusion with the ECS and RCS distinction before the standard of proof 
and extraterritoriality debate seen in Microsoft).  Kerr also suggests Congress further enhance 
privacy protections to data in storage for more than 180 days.  Id. at 1234. 
235 See Shickich, supra note 48, at 464 (stating that according to the current SCA and case 
law, judges may compel disclosure of non-content data from Twitter without obtaining a 
warrant). 
236 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (requiring that the government has “authority to issue a 
warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy 
electronically stored information located within or outside that district”); see also Backer, 
supra note 18, at 397 (urging the Supreme Court to avail email correspondence of Fourth 
Amendment protection); Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 10, at 1615 (advancing amendment to 
the SCA to cure ambiguities between the ECS and RCS distinction). 
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overly broad and vague.237  The phrase “electronic storage media” can be 
construed to mean anything from a motion picture to the information 
stored and transmitted via wearable health technology.238  Further, the 
rule does not denote whether “outside” includes foreign territories or just 
U.S. districts separate from the district issuing the warrant.239  Finally, 
while the proposed amendment would help in a situation where the 
government knows that the individual is using technological means to 
conceal the data’s location, granting a SCA warrant would still be based 
on the “specific and articulable” facts standard of reasonable suspicion 
contained in § 2703(d).240  While this proposed rule awaits approval, 
United States courts will continue to review SCA warrants under the 
evolving Microsoft paradigm.241  However, because § 2703(a) references 
the F.R.C.P., this recent amendment should, in the interest in added 
individual privacy, be revised.242  Instead, amending § 2703(d) of the SCA 
to include an increased standard of proof and limit extraterritorial 
application would comprehensively resolve the Microsoft conundrum in 
one fell swoop.243 
Others believe the Supreme Court, as in Katz, should set the standard 
of proof for requiring disclosure of email data based on probable cause 
                                                
237 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (providing the government has the “authority to issue a 
warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy 
electronically stored information located within or outside that district”). 
238 See Langley, supra note 9, at 1659 (summarizing data privacy expectations for wearables 
as the same for any other stored electronic communications); Shickich, supra note 48, at 464 
(observing that non-content data is readily subject to disclosure under the specific and 
articulable facts standard of § 2703(d)). 
239 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (adopting the government has “authority to . . . seize or 
copy electronically stored information located within or outside that district”) (emphasis 
added). 
240 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a 
provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication . . . only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant 
procedures . . . .”) (emphasis added);  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (2016) (“[a] court shall 
issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the information 
is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or 
federal law.”) (emphasis added); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (suggesting the government has 
“authority to . . . seize or copy electronically stored information located within or outside that 
district”) (emphasis added). 
241 See Schultheis, supra note 9, at 689 (concluding concerns will not subside until Congress 
updates data privacy legislation to match technology’s growing infrastructure). 
242 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a 
provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication . . . only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . .”). 
243 See supra Part III.B (examining the two issues posed in Microsoft regarding the 
appropriate standard of proof and extraterritorial application of SCA warrants). 
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and avoid Congress altogether.244  While a decision from the Supreme 
Court would resolve the issue, this theory assumes that the Supreme 
Court is ready and willing to offer blanket Fourth Amendment protections 
to a relatively new form of potentially anonymous communication.245  
Also, this theory requires a Court capable of handing down a definitive 
answer to a controversial matter.246  A sweeping solution from the Court, 
while possible due to the vacant seat on the Court left by Justice Antonin 
Scalia, presupposes the Court granting certiorari to a case involving email 
privacy and the SCA.247  Because it is possible the Court may also choose 
to deny Fourth Amendment protections to email communications or defer 
to Congress in enacting appropriate legislation, amending the SCA places 
control of the future of email privacy rightfully with the legislative 
branch.248 
Taken together, perhaps the strongest reason to amend the SCA is the 
undeniable reality that email usage today vastly differs from email usage 
in the 1980s and requires commensurate legal protection.249  Content is not 
limited to business communications as it now offers an intimate view of 
an individual’s life.250  Emails can be sent from devices other than 
computers from almost anywhere in the world.251  Paradoxically, 
                                                
244 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that communications 
conducted in a public telephone booth deserve a reasonable expectation of privacy from 
government surveillance); Backer, supra note 18, at 396 (arguing Congress has been reluctant 
to update the SCA despite rapidly advancing technology, and thus, the Supreme Court 
should tackle the issue instead). 
245 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (mentioning email and 
other Internet communications often contain the most intimate information that the 
individual wishes to keep private); Weinstein, supra note 99, at 249 (stating one way to avoid 
law enforcement surveillance on the Internet is to use anonymization software, such as Tor, 
that makes the user’s identity unknown to both the ISP and the government). 
246 See Chait, supra note 31 (noting eight justices currently preside over the Court). 
247 See Bowman, supra note 52, at 809 (noting Warshak was a 6th Circuit decision); Solove, 
Justice Scalia, supra note 84 (arguing Justice Scalia notoriously believed searches of materials 
provided to third parties do not violate the Fourth Amendment).  Justice Scalia’s absence 
means the Court may finally reign in the third-party doctrine and mandate Fourth 
Amendment protections to email communications.  Id.  See also OYEZ, supra note 31 
(conveying the Court decided Katz in a seven to one decision, with Justice Black dissenting 
and Justice Marshall abstaining).  The reasonable expectation of privacy advanced in Katz 
did not require a five-four ruling.  Id. 
248 See Backer, supra note 18, at 401 (urging the Supreme Court to scale back the 
government’s ability to seize data without proving probable cause). 
249 See Schultheis, supra note 9, at 689 (concluding that concerns will not subside until laws 
are updated to match our growing infrastructure). 
250 See Langley, supra note 9, at 1658 (analyzing data privacy expectations for fitness 
technology); Shah, supra note 9, at 540 (opining data submitted in relation to Facebook and 
WhatsApp communications are subject to disclosure under the SCA). 
251 See Daskal, supra note 9, at 366 (explaining the mobile nature of email and other Internet 
communications). 
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individuals today use the Internet regularly to share intimate information 
globally with little to no regard for the government’s near-Orwellian 
surveillance capabilities.252  Amending the SCA would attack the problem 
at the source while leaving a choice amongst the states to do the same.253  
For each of these considerations, it is imperative to equate our daily email 
correspondence to the parchment papers to which the Fourth Amendment 
refers.254 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the din of modern existence, privacy stands to be one, if not the 
most important, fundamental liberty in the twenty first century deserving 
of a rigorous defense.  Almost fifty years after Katz, communications 
technology connects U.S. citizens on an ongoing basis.  Since the name 
Snowden became widely known, many scholars and individuals believe 
that the Fourth Amendment nears obsolescence as the surveillance 
powers of the United States government expand.  Those left in peril are 
ordinary U.S. citizens who rely on email communication for business or 
personal reasons.  To quell growing concerns over digital privacy, 
Congress should amend the outdated structure of the SCA.  Otherwise, 
unchecked government surveillance power will induce the once vital 
liberties afforded by the Fourth Amendment to wither away. 
Returning to Frank’s situation, the government may only require 
disclosure of Microsoft’s domestic data after proving probable cause, as 
the language of the Fourth Amendment and the F.R.C.P. intend.  With 
greater privacy protections, U.S. citizens may freely and legally associate 
online without unnecessary fear of government surveillance.  ISPs may 
too reap the benefits of the digital age, so long as they maintain an 
acceptable balance between consumer protection and compliance with 
legitimate law enforcement requests.  While no legislation is perfect, 
organic growth of case law surrounding the CalECPA should assist in 
bringing communications privacy to the full attention of the legislature, 
the High Court, and the American public.  Well-reasoned and frequently 
                                                
252 See Atkins, supra note 99, at 86 (examining the government’s wide surveillance powers 
under the PATRIOT Act); Curry, supra note 105 (inquiring whether certain police forces are 
obtaining warrants based on probable cause before using Stingray technology); Greenwald, 
supra note 98 (revealing information provided by NSA analyst Edward Snowden in 2013 that 
the United States government conducts mass dragnet-style surveillance on cell phone data 
with the cooperation of numerous cell service providers without first seeking particularized 
search warrants). 
253 See supra Part III.B (summarizing constitutional privacy concerns that email users face 
following Microsoft). 
254 See U.S. CONST. amend IV (guaranteeing “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects”). 
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tended legislation, like the CalECPA, may prove to be the loam in which 
the roots of the Fourth Amendment receive new life. 
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